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I. PROLOGUE 
In the year 1880, in Dalles City, Oregon, a large and valuable 
load of lumber fell into the Columbia River and was about to be 
carried away by the river's waters. Since Savage, the owner of this 
lumber, was absent from the scene, Glenn - who, at that time, was 
doing construction work for Savage - "furnished help and did ser­
vice" in saving the lumber "from being washed away and lost."1 
Seven years later, the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected Glenn's 
claim that Savage owed him "the reasonable value" of his services 
as well as of the services of the workmen he employed in saving the 
lumber. The court did not deny that these services had been "meri­
torious, and probably beneficial, to Savage," but it nonetheless in­
sisted that the services "could not create a legal liability on the part 
of Savage."2 "To make him liable," the Court ruled, "he must 
either have requested the performance of the service, or, after he 
knew of the service, he must have promised to pay for it." Other­
wise, the law deems "an act done for the benefit of another, without 
his request, as a voluntary act of courtesy, for which no action can 
be sustained."3 Were it otherwise, the Court explained, the result 
would be "ruinous litigation, and the overthrow of personal rights 
and civil freedom."4 As the New Jersey Supreme Court had put it, 
in an earlier case cited by the Glenn Court, were such actions per­
mitted, "[n]o man's private business . . .  would be under his control, 
or free from the interference of strangers, perhaps idlers, drunk­
ards, and perhaps enemies, under such pretences, drawing him from 
business into litigation."5 Furthermore, if the law were otherwise, it 
would do "violence to some of the kindest and best effusions of the 
heart to suffer them afterwards to be perverted by sordid avarice."6 
Hence, the law must not permit "meritorious and generous acts" to 
be "afterwards converted into a pecuniary demand."7 
1. Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442, 443 (Or. 1887). 
2. 13 P. at 448. 
3. 13 P. at 448. 
4. 13 P. at 448 (quoting Force v. Haines, 17 N.J.L. 385, 387 (1840)). 
5. Force, 17 NJ.L. at 387. 
6. 13 P. at 448. 
7. 13 P. at 448. 
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Although some of the details of the doctrine governing such in­
stances of good samaritan intervention have changed since the sem­
inal case of Glenn v. Savage, there has been no change in the basic 
approach of the common law with regard to good samaritans who 
render help and services in response to another's need without any 
preexisting duty (private or public) to intervene. This approach is 
especially persistent in cases like Glenn v. Savage where unsolicited 
benefits are conferred in order to preserve or protect another per­
son's property or financial concerns (as distinguished from her life 
or health).8 It is best evidenced in the wide range of epithets di­
rected at good samaritans when they seek restitution for the ex­
penses they incurred or for the value of the services they supplied. 
In most cases, good samaritans are described by the courts as 
"mere" strangers, volunteers, officious meddlers, intermeddlers, or 
interlopers.9 Needless to say, use of these derogatory epithets usu­
ally indicates that the plaintiff's claim is doomed to fail.1° 
In this article, I contest this "long standing judicial reluctance to 
encourage one person to intervene in the affairs of another by 
awarding restitution of benefits thereby conferred."11 In particular, 
I take a critical look at the two rationales suggested in Glenn for 
this reluctance: the concern for preserving personal liberty and the 
claim that altruism should be reward enough in itself. I contend 
that both rationales are misconceived, and that a reasonable ac­
count of both liberty and altruism requires that we relinquish the 
traditional reluctance that typifies the law's treatment of good sa­
maritan claims. To be sure, I do not maintain that these two very 
different considerations lead to the same conclusions regarding the 
precise contours of an alternative doctrine. On the contrary, one 
theme of this article is that delineating the precise doctrinal details 
requires significant normative choices. Nonetheless, it should be 
8. See 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF REsrmrnoN § 10.3 (1978 & Supp. 1998); 
G.H.L. FRIDMAN, REsrmrnoN 271, 276-78 (2d ed. 1992); KEITH MAsoN & J.W. CARTER, 
REsrmrnON LAW IN AUSTRALIA 254 (1995). 
9. See John W. Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 V AND. L. 
REv. 1183, 1184 (1966). 
10. See REsrATEMENT OF REsTITUTioN § 2 (1937) ("A person who officiously confers a 
benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution therefor."); REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
REsrmrnoN § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983) (similar rule). In most cases where recovery 
has been allowed for services rendered to others motivated by altruism, there has been a 
strong and direct public interest in the performance of that service, such as where a close 
relative of a deceased has paid funeral expenses and seeks reimbursement from the estate. 
See, e.g., REsrATEMENT OF REsrmrnoN § 115 cmt. b (1937); JoHN P. DAWSON & GEORGE 
E. PALMER, CASES ON REsrmrnoN 48 (2d ed. 1969). This article focuses on cases in which 
no such direct public interest exists. 
11. PALMER, supra note 8, at 359. 
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emphasized that neither liberty nor altruism can vindicate either 
the traditional hostility toward unsolicited benefactors or the result 
in Glenn v. Savage. 
Indeed, my claim is that both liberty and altruism can justify, in 
certain circumstances, acknowledging good samaritan claims for re­
imbursement of expenses incurred as well as for compensation for 
services rendered or for certain damages suffered by the benefactor 
as a consequence of her act. My analysis perceives these remedies 
as instruments for encouraging beneficial interventions or, more 
precisely, for offsetting countervailing incentives faced by potential 
good samaritans. I maintain that personal liberty justifies - or 
even mandates - such an offsetting whenever it is evident (at the 
time when the potential benefactor must decide whether or not to 
act) that the beneficiary's expected gain from intervention exceeds 
the expected costs of the intervention, provided that there is no rea­
sonable way for the beneficiary to communicate actual consent. I 
further contend that there is one conception of altruism that can 
justify a similar rule and that other conceptions could be even more 
amenable to good samaritans' claims. 
The doctrine of good samaritan intervention obviously is not the 
most frequently applied segment of private law. Therefore, the di­
rect practical significance of an argument against the traditional 
doctrine may be rather marginal. Yet claims of good samaritans 
have always captured the interest of private law scholars.12 I be­
lieve that this interest is not only due to the intricacies of this doc­
trine (some of which are explored in Part III), but rather, is also 
entailed by a sense - which I hope to help vindicate in the discus­
sion that follows - that the social significance of the legal prescrip­
tion for these cases cannot be reduced to its direct behavioral 
impact. This apparently inconsequential doctrine may, upon reflec­
tion, turn out to be a rather significant segment of our law - and 
thus, indirectly, of the kind of society in which we live - due to the 
12. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler (pt. 1), 74 
HARv. L. R:Ev. 817 (1961) [hereinafter Dawson, (pt. 1)]; John P. Dawson, Negotiorum Ges­
tio: The Altruistic Intermeddler (pt. 2), 74 HARv. L. R:Ev. 1073 (1961) [hereinafter Dawson, 
(pt. 2)]; Edward W. Hope, Officiousness (pt. 1), 15 CoRNELL L.Q. 25 (1929); William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An 
Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978); Saul Levmore, Waiting 
for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative 
Obligations, 72 VA. L. R:Ev. 879 (1986); Mitchell Mcinnes, Restitution and the Rescue of Life, 
32 ALBERTA L. R:Ev. 37 (1994); F.D. Rose, Restitution for the Rescuer, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 167 (1989); Robert A. Long, Jr., Note, A Theory of Hypothetical Contract, 94 YALE 
LJ. 415 (1984). 
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symbolic and expressive ramifications of the social choices it 
embodies.13 
II. ENCOURAGING Goon SAMARITANISM 
A. Restitution as an Instrument for Encouraging 
Potential Benefactors 
In this Part, I seek to defend the claim that common law should 
change its basic approach to good samaritans and adopt, in its 
stead, a far more favorable attitude, the details of which are devel­
oped in Part III. As a prelude to the main arguments in favor of 
this conclusion, I need to clarify two presuppositions and one limi­
tation to the analysis that follows. The title of this section is in­
tended to capture the essence of these caveats, but each 
nonetheless requires a brief elaboration. 
Restitution - I suggest in the title - can serve as an instrument 
for encouraging potential benefactors to render necessary assist­
ance. Hence, I highlight the incentive effect of the applicable legal 
rules.14 More particularly, I imply two presuppositions. First, I as­
sume that the pertinent doctrine has some (at least marginal) im­
pact on the behavior of potential benefactors; or more precisely, I 
presume that the hostility demonstrated by the traditional doctrine 
toward claims made by good samaritans for restitution of the costs 
incurred due to their intervention could discourage potential bene­
factors from intervening.15 Second, I assume that the content of the 
relevant legal rules is to be decided from a prospective viewpoint, 
rather than from a retrospective perspective (or, at least, not pri­
marily on the basis of retrospective considerations).16 Hence, the 
discussion that follows omits any reference to the backward-looking 
concept of corrective justice that is, at times, said to be the underly-
13. Cf. Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Thro11gh Law, 144 U. PA. L. 
REv. 2055, 2057-58 (1996) (exploring the expressive dimension of law); Richard H. Pildes, 
The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936, 938 (1991) 
(same). 
14. For a similar approach, see ANDREW BuRRows, THE LAW OF REsrrruTioN 243-44, 
246 (1993); Garry A. Muir, Unjust Sacrifice and the Officious Intervener, in EssAYS ON REsn­
TUTION 297, 308-09, 314-15 (Paul D. Fmn ed., 1990). 
15. See Mcinnes, supra note 12, at 44-45; Rose, supra note 12, at 178. For a much more 
skeptical view regarding the ability of law to affect human behavior, see lzHAK ENoLARD, 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 43-44 (1993). 
16. For a similar assumption, see GARETH JoNES, REsrrrunoN IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
LAw 144 (1991). This assumption corresponds with the generally accepted view that one 
important function of law is to direct behavior. See JosEPH RAz, The F11nctions of Law, in 
THE AUTHORITY OF LAw: EssAYS ON LAw AND MORALITY 169 (1979). 
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ing foundation of restitutionary doctrines.17 Likewise, I will not 
consider the possibility of perceiving certain restitutionary duties 
imposed on beneficiaries of good samaritan interventions as a way 
of institutionalizing a (backward-looking) moral debt of gratitude 
on their part.18 
A prospective approach interested in affecting the behavior of 
potential benefactors can lead down several different paths, but this 
article is limited to one. One possible path, which I do not discuss 
in this article, is the imposition of positive duties to rescue and as­
sist backed by criminal or civil sanctions. The legal and philosophi­
cal questions raised by this path, then, need not be considered 
herein.19 By the same token, I will not consider, except in passing, 
the maritime doctrine of salvage, which allows rescuers a positive 
reward for their (successful) efforts.20 The considerations raised in 
the maritime context are unique - most notably, the need to pro­
mote a salvage industry, due mainly to the unique equipment and 
skills that are required for successful interventions - and are, 
therefore, beyond the scope of this article. 
Hence, I will focus exclusively on only one type of legal norm, 
namely, those rules that entitle benefactors to restitution of the 
costs they have incurred due to and while performing their well­
intended services. These rules seem to be intended to offset "pre­
legal" countervailing disincentives for potential good samaritans; to 
"neutralize" any worry they may have ex ante that their other­
regarding intervention ultimately will cause them actual loss, such 
as uncompensated expenses or damages (the terms "encourage" 
and "encouragement" are employed below as shorthand for this 
more precise meaning).21 In advocating expansion of these rules, 
17. See Kit Barker, Unjust Enrichment: Containing the Beast, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 457, 468-74 (1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming 1999). I have expressed some skepticism 
elsewhere with regard to the explanatory power, as well as the normative value, of the con­
cept of corrective justice for restitutionary theory. See liANoCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICH­
MENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PuBuc VALUES 31-32 (1997). 
18. See generally A. JoHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND PoLmCAL OBLIGATIONS 
163-183 (1979) (discussing the moral debt of gratitude). 
19. See generally Michael A. Menlowe, The Philosophical Foundations of a Duty to Res­
cue, in THE DUIY TO REsCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 5 (Michael A. Menlowe & 
Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1993). 
20. For a review of the pertinent doctrine, see Ross A. Albert, Co=ent, Restitutionary 
Recovery for Rescuers of Human Life, 14 CALL. REv. 85, 111-15 (1986). 
21. Saul Levmore suggests that "it is convenient to think of a legal right to reimburse­
ment as a reward," because whereas reimbursement in itself merely "erases a penalty other­
wise incurred by a rescuer," a legal entitlement to reimbursement of expenses creates "a 
package of reimbursement, public acclaim, and private gratitude," which, as a whole, may be 
regarded by potential rescuers as "a substantial carrot." Levmore, supra note 12, at 882. In 
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this Part confronts a fundamental question: Why should the law 
discard its traditional reluctant stance - which merely maintains 
the "pre-legal" state of affairs in which claims of potential benefac­
tors are not guaranteed - and adopt, in its stead, a doctrine that 
encourages good samaritan intervention? 
The following sections suggest two answers to this question. 
The first answer acts to justify encouragement of good samaritan­
ism by referring to the (hypothetical) will of the beneficiary. The 
second answer finds its premise in the inherent value of altruism, 
and its justification for encouraging good samaritanism is concern 
for others, which is nurtured and inculcated by beneficial interven­
tions. As we shall see, the relationship between the personal liberty 
account and the altruistic account is not a simple one. These two 
approaches raise different considerations that may justify - Glenn 
v. Savage notwithstanding - encouraging good samaritanism. The 
latter approach, which is grounded in altruism, however, is open to 
several different interpretations, yielding correspondingly divergent 
policies. While one version of this approach serves to reinforce the 
conclusions of the personal liberty account, others engender certain 
variations of this account, some of which are rather radical. This 
complexity should be borne in mind when we arrive at Part III of 
this article, where I outline an alternative doctrine of good samari­
tan intervention. 
B. Personal Liberty and the Encouragement of 
Beneficial Interventions 
A tentative draft of the Second Restatement of Restitution 
explains, 
The chief policy [of the doctrine that denies restitution for benefits 
officiously conferred] can be expressed in two ways. First, a person 
should have the privilege of determining for [her ]self what obligations 
[she] wishes to assume; and second, no one should be empowered to 
thrust a benefit on another and by that means become [her] creditor. 
contrast to these incentives, which Levmore suggests may turn reimbursement into a positive 
reward, there are countervailing factors that reduce the likelihood of the promised reim· 
bursement's being awarded or being fully compensatory if awarded (for example, the possi­
bility that the ex post judicial determination will not perceive the intervention as reasonable, 
the litigation costs involved, the possible difficulties in collecting the reimbursement, or the 
possibility of the beneficiary's insolvency). It is difficult to decide how to balance all of the 
additional considerations mentioned in this footnote. Therefore - and for the sake of keep­
ing the analysis simple - I assume that they are more or less of equal force, thus ignoring 
them altogether. 
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The ideal is that of self-determination, or autonomy, in incurring 
obligations.22 
But does this ideal - which, for the purposes of this section, is 
assumed to be an uncontroversial good - in actual fact justify the 
rather extreme anti-interventionist rules currently prevalent in most 
Anglo-American jurisdictions? I believe that it does not. In order 
to understand why, we must first consider the familiar account of 
requiring restitution for unsolicited benefits in the name of a "hypo­
thetical contract."23 
1. The Hypothetical Contract Theory 
The prescription advocated by hypothetical contract theorists is 
simple and powerful: courts, they claim, should allow recovery to 
unsolicited interveners - that is, should allow them to impose a 
hypothetical contract on their beneficiaries - if, and only if, the 
court can reasonably conclude that at the point in time that the ben­
efit was conferred, the beneficiary would have agreed to pay for it 
had she been able to communicate her express wishes. Thus, this 
requirement implies that recovery is justified only if two conditions 
are met: (a) prohibitive transaction costs - usually due to the un­
availability of the beneficiary or the need of an immediate interven­
tion - preclude the possibility of negotiating an express agreement 
before conferring the benefit; and (b) the imposed transaction 
mimics the assumed (ex ante) intentions of the beneficiary - that 
is, the transaction is to her advantage (when its expected benefits 
are compared with its expected costs).24 
22. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsrrnmoN § 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983). 
For similar propositions, see Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co., 34 Ch. D. 234, 248 (Eng. 
C.A. 1886); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-REsrrnmON 376, 470 
(2d ed. 1993); GEORGE B. KLIPPERT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 99-100 (1983); MAsoN & 
CARTER, supra note 8, at 237, 241; SJ. STOLJAR, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACT 185-86 (2d 
ed. 1989); Lee J. Aileen, Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law: A Jurisdictional Ap­
proach, 11 SYDNEY L. REv. 566, 598 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: 
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 200-01 (1992); John 
D. McCamus, Necessitous Intervention: The Altruistic Intermeddler and the Law of Restitu­
tion, 11 OTTAWA L. REv. 297, 300-01 (1979). 
23. The idea of a hypothetical contract should not be confused with the arcane and infa­
mous legal fiction that conceptualized the entirety of the law of restitution in terms of 
"quasi" contract or contract "implied-in-law." See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN 
MrND 42 (1970) (criticizing the concept of contract implied-in-law); Christopher T. Wonnell, 
Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 45 EMORY L.J. 153, 212-14 (1996) 
(same). 
24. See RICHARD A. PosNER, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.13, at 151-52 (5th ed. 
1998); Long, supra note 12, at 420-24. The seeds of a doctrine based on these conditions can 
be found within the traditional rules which allow, in similar circumstances, claims ."to restitu­
tion for services rendered or expenditures incurred" in preserving another's things or credit, 
but only if the claimant "was in lawful possession or custody of the things or if [s]he lawfully 
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Hypothetical contract theorists are divided, however, with re­
spect to such idiosyncratic preferences as the preference to benefit 
from one's own efforts rather than from the unsolicited efforts of 
others. On the one hand, it has been claimed that the "court­
imposed transaction [must make] the involuntary parties subjec­
tively better off, not merely . . .  [increase] their wealth."25 There­
fore, any subjective objection, even if based on idiosyncratic or 
accidental characteristics of the defendants should be "a fatal re­
sponse to a proposed hypothetical agreement. "26 On the other 
hand, proponents of a more expansive doctrine have maintained 
that the courts should not allow such evidence of idiosyncratic pref­
erences or accidental characteristics of the beneficiary and should 
adhere instead to an "idealized contract of the kind that rational 
and informed parties would have perceived as mutually beneficial 
had they had that opportunity."27 
These views are obviously at odds in terms of their doctrinal 
implications, but they share an underlying assumption. The restric­
tive approach insists that the hypothetical contract story be prem­
ised upon the value of individual liberty and suggests that 
abandoning the subjective utility calculus in favor of an objective 
standard of cost-benefit analysis violates this value. The expansive 
approach unabashedly admits that a hypothetical contract imposed 
where the twofold requirement doctrine is met cannot be supported 
by values of personal autonomy. Rather, such hypothetical con­
tracts are justified only by efficiency considerations: they are in­
tended to "reward the bestowers of positive externalities" and to 
encourage "value-creating activities" in cases where "market alter­
natives" are unavailable.28 Thus, both approaches presuppose that 
individual liberty cannot justify the relatively broad doctrine that 
finds the satisfaction of the two conditions listed above sufficient to 
support liability. 
I wish to challenge this assumption and, in so doing, claim that 
personal liberty - and not only efficiency - justifies a doctrine 
that admits good samaritan claims for restitution whenever the 
took possession thereof," i.e., where she finds herself in the position of an involuntary bailee. 
REsrATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 117 (1937). 
25. Long, supra note 12, at 424. 
26. Id. 
27. Wonnell, supra note 23, at 214; cf. Richard A. Epstein, Causation and Corrective Jus­
tice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477, 490, 492 (1979). 
28. See Wonnell, supra note 23, at 216-17. 
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above two (objective) conditions are met.29 Substantiating this 
claim requires, first, some elaboration of the Second Restatement's 
ideal of self-determination, or autonomy, in incurring obligations. 
It also requires exploring the (weak) sense in which the court­
imposed contract is hypothetical in cases of good samaritan inter­
vention where the two conditions of the hypothetical contract the­
ory are fulfilled. Finally, it requires explaining why such 
hypothetical contracts - as opposed to contracts that are hypothet­
ical in a stronger sense - can coexist with (and are maybe even 
required by) the ideal of personal liberty. 
2. The Restatement's Ideal 
The Second Restatement's ideal of self-determination, or auton­
omy, in incurring obligations30 echoes the familiar liberal value 
(some may prefer to call it ideology) of negative liberty. It is prem­
ised on the belief that independence ("freedom from") -although 
it is not necessarily the ultimate value - is essential to personal 
development and autonomy.31 Because each individual is distinct 
and unique, each should be able to choose her goals voluntarily (as 
well as the means of achieving such goals) and should be held re­
sponsible for such choices.32 People should enjoy-that is, the law 
should guarantee them -a private moral sphere that is free from 
forcible human interference. Boundary crossing, trespassing on the 
individual's moral space, should be viewed with suspicion and, pref­
erably, deterred. Individuals should, therefore, be entitled to con­
trol of their resources, at least insofar as they do not actively harm 
others in exercising such control. Their actual consent -express or 
implied, but, in all events, actual and not legally imposed -should 
29. The discussion that follows can be read as an extension of Randy Barnett's claim that 
a consent theory of contract can coexist with (and even justify) the objective approach to 
contract interpretation. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 269, 300-07 (1986). 
30. One may assume that this ideal does not restrict the legitimacy of imposing a duty not 
to harm others. 
31. See lsAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FoUR EssAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122, 
124 (1969). But see generally CHAR.LEs TAYLOR, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in 
PHILOSOPHY AND nm HUMAN SqENCES (PHILosoPHICAL PAPERS 2) 211 (1985) (challenging 
the coherence of the notion-0F-negative liberty). 
32. See Charles Fried, Is Liberty Possible?, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND LAw: SELECTED 
TANNER LECTURES ON MoRAL PHILosoPHY 89, 94-95 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1987). 
Charles Taylor calls the vision of the human condition underlying the Restatement's ideal 
"atomism." See CHAR.LES TAYLOR, Atomism, in PHILosoPHY AND nm HUMAN SCIENCES 
(PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 2) 187, 187-88 (1985). 
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be the prerequisite to any legitimate transfer of, or interference 
with, any of their resources.33 
This normative infrastructure explains the instinctive caution 
with which common law treats good samaritans34 (although I insist 
below that this infrastructure does not justify the extent of its hostil­
ity toward their claims). Instances of unsolicited benefits threaten 
potential beneficiaries' control over their resources. Hence, a legal 
regime that takes seriously people's negative liberty must adopt the 
potential beneficiary's point of view. It must, as a rule, require that 
these potential beneficiaries be the gatekeepers of their own affairs. 
Thus, a contract is the proper and only legitimate way of effectuat­
ing any external interference, especially where, in the final analysis, 
it is performed at the expense of the beneficiary of the interference. 
A person's actual - and not idealized - consent, her unencum­
bered free will, should be the sole judge of the desirability of any 
external interference in her affairs. 
3. Strong and Weak Hypothetical Contracts 
The previous paragraphs explain why claims of idealized or hy­
pothetical contracts, which are currently in vogue in normative dis­
course, are frequently problematic from the standpoint of personal 
liberty. Thus, for example, there has been some resistance - which 
I find convincing - to using a hypothetical contract as justification 
for the normative desirability of wealth maximization. Critics claim 
that the consent that is attributed to individuals in order to accord a 
contractarian validation to the maxim of wealth maximization is not 
only hypothetical, it is often counterfactual - that is, attributed to 
individuals in circumstances where it is rather obvious that had they 
been asked for their opinion, they would not have given the consent 
attributed to them and may have even expressed objection.35 One 
important reason for this conclusion is that, due to the marginal 
utility of money, wealth maximization systematically improves the 
33. See, e.g., STEVEN LUKES, INDIVIDUALISM 66 (1973); ROBERT Noz1cK, ANARCHY, 
STATE, AND UTOPIA 57, 71-73 (1974); F.A. Hayek, Freedom and Coercion, in LIBERTY 80, 81-
82, 89, 95-98 (David Miller ed., 1991). 
34. See JoNES, supra note 16, at 139; P.B.H. Birks, Negotiorum Gestio and the Common 
Law, 24 CuRRENT LEGAL PROBS . 110, 112 (1971); Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: 
Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 463-64 (1992); Hope, 
supra note 12, at 29, 31. 
35. See JuLES L. COLEMAN, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, in MARKETS, 
MoRALS AND THE LAW 95, 127-29 (1988); RONALD DWORKIN, Why Efficiency?, in A MAT­
TER OF PRINCIPLE 267, 275-80 (1985). 
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condition of the better-off, but may well also systematically hurt the 
worse-off.36 
But note the difference in the hypothetical contract discussed in 
this section, as opposed to the hypothetical contract which is said to 
justify the maxim of wealth maximization.37 Unlike the hypotheti­
cal contract advanced by proponents of wealth maximization, ours 
is not evidently counterfactual;38 in other words, it is not a contract 
that systematically leads to one party finding itself on the losing 
side. To be sure, the hypothetical contract discussed here has never 
been agreed to, explicitly or implicitly, by the parties involved. It is, 
nonetheless, idealized in only a weak sense. It is supported by the 
outward behavior of the benefactor and - much more significantly 
- by reasonable assumptions regarding the consent of the benefici­
ary: the hypothetical contract must be, from the beneficiary's (ex 
ante) point of view, cost-beneficial and enforced only because pro­
hibitive transaction costs prevented actual negotiation. Further­
more, an implicit, third condition under the hypothetical contract 
theory needs to be addressed explicitly in order to explain the weak 
sense of idealization it requires. According to this condition, any 
external indication, explicit or implicit, of the beneficiary's objec­
tion (idiosyncratic as it may be) to the beneficial interference that 
the benefactor should have reasonably noticed before conferring 
the benefit necessarily mandates the rejection of a claim of a hypo­
thetical contract and, thus, denial of the good samaritan claim. Any 
actual or implied voice of the beneficiary that indicates that she 
may disapprove of the intervention must be fatal to this claim if we 
are to remain loyal to personal liberty. 
Indeed, unlike stronger forms of hypothetical contracts, ours is a 
modest technique that is intended to assess, in circumstances where 
there is no better method, what the best course of action would be 
from the perspective of the potential beneficiary herself. The last 
stage of my argument in this section is to claim that this weak form 
of a hypothetical contract does not violate the conception of per­
sonal liberty discussed above and, indeed, may even be required by 
36. See Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 227, 240 (1980). 
37. The discussion that follows can be read as criticism of the indiscriminate nature of 
some of the critiques of contractarian arguments in law, such as Jules L. Coleman et al., A 
Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 
HARV. J.L. & PuB. POLY. 639, 645-46 (1989). 
38. Cf. PETER BIRKS, AN INrn.ooucnoN TO THE LAW OF REsmunoN 195 (1985). 
1164 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 97:1152 
it.39 The ramifications of successfully substantiating this claim 
would be that personal liberty, and not only efficiency, necessarily 
supports the expansive approach to the hypothetical contract 
theory.40 
4. Weak Hypothetical Contracts and Personal Liberty 
Consider the choice faced by the court in a case of good samari­
tan intervention: it can either afford relief or refrain from doing so. 
If it declines, it acts to deter (for most - rational and not particu­
larly other-regarding-potential benefactors) interferences, which 
are, from the ex ante perspective of the beneficiary, cost-benefi­
cial.41 The reason for this disincentive is straightforward: because 
negotiation is impractical, a potential benefactor would fear that 
the beneficiary -whom she does not know and can only presume 
to be as rational and not particularly other-regarding as she is -
would refuse ex post to reimburse her for her expenses, from which 
the beneficiary has already benefitted. Put differently, without a 
legal guarantee, a potential benefactor - who needs to decide 
whether to intervene before she is able to receive the beneficiary's 
binding commitment that she will, indeed, reimburse her - must 
take into account that her well-intended intervention could be 
abused. This would, at least at the margin, deter beneficial inter­
ventions. In most cases, where the potential beneficiary is rational, 
this result would frustrate, rather than enhance, her preferences. 
I, for one, would be hard-pressed to find a reason for how the 
law, in the name of personal liberty, could lead to such a disap­
pointing outcome. Once the third (no observable objection) and 
first (prohibitive transaction costs) conditions of the hypothetical 
contract theory are fulfilled, the defendant cannot be said to be de­
prived of any meaningful choice.42 The choice to encourage or dis­
courage interventions that are objectively beneficial (as assured by 
the second condition of this weak hypothetical contract theory) 
must be made, in any event, by the law. Is it reasonable for the law 
39. A similar justification for resorting to "weak hypothetical contracts" emerges from 
Ronald Dworkin's argument against interpreting Rawls's original position as an argument of 
a "strong hypothetical contract." See RONALD DwoRKIN, Justice and Rights, in TAKING 
R.lGIITS SERIOUSLY 152 (1977). 
40. The expansive approach to the hypothetical contract theory maintains that good sa­
maritan claims should not be denied due to idiosyncratic preferences that the good samaritan 
could not have observed prior to her intervention. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
41. See Donald Wittman, Good Samaritan Rule, in 2 THE NEW PALSORAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND TiiE LAW 202 {1998). 
42. See DoBBS, supra note 22, at 485. 
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to undermine the preferences of the majority of (rational) benefi­
ciaries (by discouraging beneficial interferences) in the name of 
preventing any boundary crossing when we ·cannot be absolutely 
certain that the beneficiary would have voluntarily consented? Is it 
reasonable to do so even in circumstances where beneficiaries have 
no way of communicating their (frequent) approval or (in the rare 
cases of idiosyncratic beneficiaries) disapproval? 
These questions must be answered in the negative.43 While wa­
riness of boundary crossings - the commitment to negative free­
dom - is of immense importance for personal liberty, it is not, as 
may be recalled, its ultimate prescription (at least not in the liberal 
tradition).44 Rather, negative freedom serves a more fundamental 
purpose: personal development and autonomy, in other words, 
self-determination. In many cases, promoting the means (negative 
freedom) does not clash with achieving the end (self-determina­
tion). In some cases, however, promoting the means does threaten 
to undermine the end. In such cases the legal norms that best pro­
mote negative freedom must retreat and give way to those norms 
that best promote the individual's more essential interest to act on 
her goals and aspirations. 
Cases of good samaritan intervention in which all three condi­
tions of the hypothetical contract theory are met clearly belong to 
this category. Where it is impractical to inquire whether the benefi­
ciary approves of the intervention and there are no external indica­
tions that she disapproves of the court-imposed contract of 
intervention in consideration of restitution of expenses, a court 
would be justified in allowing claims on the basis of a hypothetical 
contract, provided that the intervention is (ex ante) cost-benefi­
cial.45 As we have seen, rejecting such claims would have the effect 
of discouraging potential good samaritans. This undoubtedly would 
promote the means of deterring boundary crossings, thereby pre­
serving the individual's moral space from any interference by an-
43. The argument that follows is not intended, obviously, to exhaust the familiar debate 
respecting negative vs. positive liberty, since many of its aspects - e.g., the meaningfulness 
of choice without adequate means or the legitimacy of interfering with people's explicit 
choices which seem "objectively" to their detriment - are irrelevant here. My only concern 
is to highlight the difficulties of a position that insists on preventing boundary crossings 
where all three conditions of the weak hypothetical contract account apply. 
44. See H.L.A. HART, Between Utility and Rights, in EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHI­
LOSOPHY 198, 206-07 (1983); WILL KYMLICKA, CoNTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 120, 
123-25 (1990). 
45. Courts nonetheless may be concerned that their ex post evaluation of the benefactor's 
ex ante estimation of the expected efficiency of her intervention may be prone to error, and, 
therefore, they may increase somewhat the margin of error to ensure that the contract they 
are imposing indeed corresponds to the beneficiary's ex ante interests. 
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other and serving, in the best possible way, the interests of certain 
idiosyncratic beneficiaries. In most cases, however, discouraging 
good samaritanism would be at the cost of frustrating the end that 
we initially ascribed to such a policy, namely, ensuring that an indi­
vidual's preferences determine the fate of everything that is within 
her moral space.46 
C. Varieties of Altruism and the Alleged Paradox of 
Encouraging Altruism 
Having discussed the first, liberty-based argument advanced in 
Glenn v. Savage, I wish to tum now to the second argument raised 
against claims of good samaritans. "The law will never permit," de­
clared the Glenn court, "a friendly act, or such as was intended to 
be an act of kindness or benevolence, to be afterwards converted 
into a pecuniary demand." The reason for this is that it "would be 
doing violence to some of the kindest and best effusions of the 
heart to suffer them afterwards to be perverted by sordid ava­
rice. "47 In other words - those of an English court almost a cen­
tury earlier - "perhaps it is better for the public that these 
voluntary acts of benevolence from one man to another, which are 
charities and moral duties, but not legal duties, should depend alto­
gether for their reward upon the moral duty of gratitude."48 
Should, indeed, altruism be its own reward?49 By allowing 
claims of good samaritans, do courts in fact obliterate altruism? In 
what follows, I answer these questions in the negative. I maintain 
that, contrary to the spirit of these judicial statements (and to some 
academic elaborations thereupon),50 a genuine commitment to fos­
tering altruism requires a favorable legal response in cases of altru­
istic intervention. I begin by offering a summary account of the 
value of altruism and by characterizing such a favorable doctrine as 
46. Can this conclusion be too harsh on beneficiaries for whom the intervention is not 
value-increasing due to their relative poverty (which makes the effective cost of payment 
higher for them than for the typical beneficiary)? Will such beneficiaries be forced into desti­
tution? This result may indeed eventuate in cases of bodily injuries sustained by good samar­
itans, hence the plausibility of socializing this type of cost, discussed infra text accompanying 
notes 179-81. In other types of cases, however, they are much less likely to occur, because in 
most interventions the benefactor would know (or, in any event, should have known) - as 
we usually do utilizing normal social cues - the approximate status of the intended benefici­
ary and should thus take it into account. Hence, it is only respecting "real eccentricities" that 
my discussion concludes that subjective preferences should not be counted. 
47. Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442, 448 (Or. 1887). 
48. Nicholson v. Chapman, 126 Eng. Rep. 536, 539 (1793). 
49. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) oF REsrrruuoN § 3 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
1983); McCamus, supra note 22, at 302. 
50. See infra text accompanying notes 63-68. 
March 1999] Good Samaritan 1167 
a form of "institutionalized limited altruism." Only with this as my 
background can I consider the abovementioned challenges and try 
to explain why I find them to be misconceived. Having cleared the 
way for an altruism-based argument for good samaritan claims, this 
section will conclude by considering some of the complexities of 
such an argument: pointing to certain varieties of altruism and to 
the entailing divergent doctrinal implications. 
1. Restitution as Institutionalized Limited Altruism 
Philosophers have invested considerable thought to the impor­
tance we attach to altruism, but this is not the appropriate place for 
a detailed account. It will suffice to mention two approaches.51 
One view contends that altruism arises from the human capacity to 
view oneself simultaneously from both the personal and the imper­
sonal standpoints. This capacity is premised on "a recognition of 
the reality of other persons, and on the equivalent capacity to re­
gard oneself as merely one individual among many," all of whom 
are included in a common world and are persons in as full a sense as 
oneself is.52 Another view explains altruism in communitarian 
terms. This account emphasizes the human need for social solidar­
ity, communal concern, and a sense of togetherness, all of which can 
be satisfied only in a moral community that is premised on a maxim 
of mutual responsibility - hence, our natural tendency to under­
stand any other-regarding requirement as a way of contributing to a 
community we regard as our own.53 These accounts differ in many 
respects. Nonetheless, they converge in finding that the justifica­
tion for responding to others' claims is the importance we attach (or 
should attach) to others, whether as atomized human beings or as 
fellow members of our constitutive community - whether due to 
rational deliberation or to innate emotions. In short, the appeal of 
51. A third explanation of altruism is based on empathy, or identification with others and 
the incorporation of their interests into our subjective welfare function. See Jane J. 
Mansbridge, The Rise and Fall of Self Interest in the Explanation of Political Life, in BEYOND 
SELF-INTEREST 3, 20 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A 
Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, 
supra at 25, 31-34. But surely the benevolent sentiments people actually have are directed at 
a much narrower circle than the entire range of beneficiaries of the legal rules discussed 
herein (i.e., the whole legal community - typically the state). See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE 
NEEDS OF STRANGERS (1984). Hence, the empathy factor will not be considered here. 
52. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE PossIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 3, 19, 82, 88, 100, 144 (1970). 
53. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LoYALTY: AN EssAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATION­
SHIPS 18 (1993); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 143 (1982); 
Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us - Not Me, or My Conscience, in 
BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 51, at 97, 99; David Miller, Distributive Justice: What the 
People Think, 102 ETHICS 555, 560-62, 570-72 (1992). 
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other-regarding ideas derives from the other-regarding element of 
the self. 
I suggest that we analyze a doctrine that takes a favorable view 
of good samaritan interventions as a form of institutionalized lim­
ited altruism:s4 a legal device that calls for other-regarding action 
and seeks to inculcate other-regarding motives; an institutional de­
sign that responds to and supports the other-regarding perspective 
of human beings.ss Thus, such a doctrine regards us as "divided 
selves": individuals who have both a personal perspective - preoc­
cupied with self-interest - and an impersonal or communitarian 
perspective (depending on one's preferred theory of altruism), 
which is the source of other-regarding action.s6 This doctrine ap­
peals to the other-regarding standpoint of the agent. It seeks to 
sustain and inculcate her other-regarding side or, at least, to create 
"an ecological niche" for altruistic behavior and altruistic motives.s7 
The metaphor of a divided self helps explain the limited altru­
ism that this proposed doctrine seeks to institutionalize. A restitu­
tionary doctrine that favors good samaritan claims does not require 
actual self-sacrifice; instead, it guarantees potential good samaritans 
reimbursement of any expenses they incur. It thus encourages 
them to be aware of another's distress, expecting them to inconven­
ience themselves to some extent in response to such distress. It en­
courages them, more precisely, to be prepared to set aside pursuit 
of their nonwelfare interests for the benefit of others, knowing that 
54. Altruism is one of the most prominent explications given by civil law scholars for the 
doctrine of Negotiorum Gestio, which deals with good samaritan interventions. See ALAIN A. 
LAVASSEUR, LoUISIANA LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND QUASI-CONTRACTS 68-69 
(1951); LEON SHASKOLSKY SHELEFF, THE BYSTANDER: BEHAVIOR, LAW, ETHICS 131 (1978); 
Samuel J. Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, in 10 INTL. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 
17, at 13 (1984); Cheryl L. Martin, Co=ent, Louisiana State Law Institute Proposes Revi­
sion of Negotiorum Gestio and Codification of Unjust Enrichment, 69 TuL. L. REv. 181, 212 
(1994). 
55. Cf. NAGEL, supra note 52, at 79. I believe that expanding the notion of self-interest to 
incorporate other-regarding motives only makes it vacuous, because we are still left with the 
problem of distinguishing action that is totally indifferent to the ultimate welfare of others 
from action that is, at least partially, concerned with the welfare of others. In contrast, in 
separating the notions of "self-interest" (narrowly perceived) and "altruism," we maintain 
and, thus, are able to examine this important distinction. See AMrrAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL 
DIMENSION: TowARD A NEW EcoNoMics 34-35 (1988); Christopher Jencks, Varieties of Al­
truism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 51, at 53, 55. 
56. See THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 10-32 (1991); BRIAN BARRY, THE­
ORIES OF JUSTICE 283-85, 357-66 (1989); ETZIONI, supra note 55, at 63, 85, 253-54; Jane J. 
Mansbridge, Preface to BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 51, at ix, xiii. 
57. See NAGEL, supra note 56, at 18, 20; Jane J. Mansbridge, On the Relation of Altruism 
and Self Interest, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 51, at 133. 
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any actual sacrifice they may make in their intervention is only tem­
porary, that is, relatively easily reversed.SS 
Indeed, the altruism institutionalized herein is by no means of a 
heroic or purely selfless nature; it does not expect unreserved sub­
ordination of an agent's self-interest. On the contrary, it is a some­
what calculated altruism, a willingness to benefit the other, but at 
the other's own expense.59 Nevertheless, requiring people to serve 
the interests of others in circumstances where the former have no 
self-interest in so doing (such as the possibility of reaping some 
profit or reward)60 is virtuous enough. Such delineation of the ex­
pected balance between self and other is a sensible limitation of the 
level of altruism (the "call of duty") prescribed by a doctrine that 
acknowledges that our self is divided; that an individual's primary 
attachment is to her personal interests, projects, and commitments; 
and that institutionalized altruism can insist only that such attach­
ment be restrained by the other-regarding standpoint.61 After all, 
moral individuals are not - and should not be expected to be -
moral saints; they do not - and should not be expected to - set 
aside their needs; "they include themselves in the calculation and 
give themselves weight in the determination of the right action to 
make."62 
2. Altruism and Law 
Consider now the difficulty with which this section began. At 
least as it is conventionally perceived, altruism is a virtue, "a self­
perfective quality." It focuses on the agent's nature and defines 
moral goodness in terms of "the excellence of the agent's charac-
58. See John Kleinig, Good Samaritanism, 5 PHIL & Ptra. AFF. 382, 385 (1976); cf. Ernest 
Weinrib, Rescue and Restitution, 1 S'vARA: J. PHIL & JUDAISM 59, 64-65 (1990). 
59. See Stoljar, supra note 54, at 14, 24, 149. 
60. For a more detailed discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 155-59. 
61. See NAGEL, supra note 56, at 37-38. Tue difficulty with setting limits on the degree of 
altruism expected from "a divided self' is aggravated when one considers, as we do here, 
altruism in the context of the large scale nation-state (or, even more obviously, the world 
community), rather than in the context of any smaller sub-unit thereof. When large numbers 
of potential beneficiaries are involved - as in the case of practically every legal community 
- small contributions add up to "heroic totals" that most would perceive as "beyond the call 
of duty." See JAMES S. F1sHKIN, THE LIMITS OF OBLIGATION (1982). 
62. Jean Hampton, Selflessness and the Loss of Self, in ALTRUISM 135, 164 (Ellen Frankel 
Paul et al. eds., 1993); see also id. at 144-45; cf. Peninsular & Oriental, Etc. v. Overseas Oil 
Carriers, Inc., 553 F.2d 830, 836 (2d Cir. 1977) (maintaining that seeking reimbursement of 
expenses - as distinguished from a reward - does not make "assistance to an ailing seaman 
a matter of negotiation, rather than moral duty. On the contrary . . .  this rule will encourage 
seamen aboard large vessels to perform their moral obligation to their brethren on smaller 
ships without fear their benevolence will result in unreasonable expenses to their ship's 
owners."). 
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ter."63 Beneficial consequences can be achieved with or without ex­
cellence of character and with or without contributing to such 
excellence.64 When an action leading to such consequences is "self­
initiated and proactive" - a result of an "uncoerced voluntary 
choice" - it is indeed virtuous, that is, genuinely altruistic. But 
when it is instead "instrumental" and "reactive" - compelled or 
otherwise driven by certain external incentives - no virtue and, 
therefore, no altruism is involved.65 No action, however appropri­
ate, insightful, or beneficial, can qualify as altruistic (virtuous) if not 
freely chosen.66 Even worse, expanding the category of beneficial 
actions that are not truly virtuous in fact undermines altruism, since 
it makes this virtue increasingly unnecessary and, thus, unimpor­
tant, relegating altruism to "the dustbin of supererogatory."67 
Therefore, institutionalizing altruism - if not an oxymoron - is at 
least an undesirable phenomenon, because it "could only reduce 
the moral worth of human action."68 In order to sustain its status as 
a virtue, altruism needs to be - as prescribed by the Glenn court -
a reward in and of itself, and the best course of action for a legal 
system interested in inculcating altruism is simple inaction. 
This is a broad and ambitious argument. It is not satisfied with 
merely casting doubt on the value of imposing criminal or civil 
sanctions for noninterference to allay another's distress. Rather, it 
goes beyond that, implying that even if the behavioral effect of a 
restitutionary doctrine favorable to good samaritans is not as dra­
matic as that of a doctrine that imposes positive obligations to as­
sist, the former doctrine is still bad enough. Notwithstanding 
certain quantitative distinctions, any form of legal intervention -
whether discouraging noninterference, rewarding successful inter­
ventions, or offsetting the pre-legal incentives facing potential good 
samaritans - can be interpreted as a device for promoting compli­
ance with some public (external) policy;69 thus, any such interven­
tion has devastating implications for the virtue of altruism. 
63. Douglas J. Den Uyl, The Right to Welfare and the Virtue of Charity, in ALTRUISM, 
supra note 62, at 192, 197, 205. 
64. See id. at 197. 
65. See id. at 192, 222-23. 
66. See id. at 197. 
67. See id. at 193. 
68. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL Sron. 151, 200 
(1973). 
69. Cf. ROGER CoTIERRELL, THE Pouncs OF JurusPRUDENCE 62 (1989); Neil Duxbury, 
Robert Hale and the Economy of Legal Force, 53 Mon. L. REv. 421, 433-34 (1990); Antony 
M. Honore, Law, Morals and Rescue, in THE Goon SAMARITAN AND nm LAW 225, 226 
(James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1981). 
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But is, indeed, the concept of altruism extraneous to law? Is 
there no possibility of promoting altruism - or any other virtue, 
for that matter - through law? Is institutionalizing virtues, such as 
altruism, necessarily destructive? I believe that such conclusions 
are far too extreme and probably misguided. 
To understand why, consider the conception of law implied by 
these challenges. Law is perceived merely as a set of incentives that 
serves as the basis for the prediction of some external reaction, hos­
tile or favorable, to deviation from or compliance with its dictates. 
This conception echoes the infamous predictive theory of law.70 As 
such, it disregards the "internal point of view" applied by most of us 
with regard to the law, according to which legal norms are taken as 
"guides for the conduct of social life;" bases for claims, demands, 
and criticism; and standards for conduct and judgment.71 Further­
more, it is now rather commonplace to assume that law - like 
other major social practices and institutions - simultaneously re­
flects the prevailing belief system of its constituents, as well as 
shapes it; that the relationship between people's dispositions and 
the values ingrained into their society's institutional design is one of 
reciprocity; that our attitudes toward one another and the prescrip­
tions of our legal regime are embedded in one holistic web, each 
one inculcating and inculcated by the other.72 
If the law is, in fact, such an important social institution, shap­
ing, to some extent, its constituents' perceptions of themselves (in 
other words, if the law cannot avoid affecting popular conscious­
ness ),73 then it seems plausible that the law, like other primary so­
cial institutions, serves - intentionally or inadvertently - to 
preserve, sustain, and reinforce a certain equilibrium between the 
70. For the classic statement of the predictive theory of law, see OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920). 
71. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88 (1961); JosEPH RAz, The Relevance 
of Coherence, in ETHICS IN THE PUBuc DoMAIN: EssAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND 
PoLmcs 261, 280-81 (1994). 
72. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man, 
in THE lNrERPRETATION OF Cur.TURES: SELECTED EssAYS 33 (1973); ALASDAIR 
MAclNTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 220 (2d ed. 1984); SANDEL, 
supra note 53, at 179; CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MoD­
ERN IDENTITY 27 (1989); J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1133, 1137, 
1142, 1168-69 (1991). 
73. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, 
in LoCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EssAYS IN lNrERPRETIVE ANnmoPOLOGY 167, 218-19 
(1983); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRmQUE OF ADJUDICATION 63, 227-28 (1997); Austin Sarat 
& Thomas R. Keams, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship in Everyday 
Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 27-32, 51-54 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds., 
1993). 
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self-regarding and the other-regarding perspectives of agents in a 
relevant legal community.74 
Therefore, we should think of legal norms that encourage good 
samaritanism as a public expression of our bonds of concern and 
solidarity with others - a symbolic political expression of the im­
portance that our community attaches to other-regarding actions 
and motives.75 Glenn's challenge notwithstanding, such norms not 
only promote beneficial consequences (altruistic action), but also 
preserve and inculcate the other-regarding aspect of our selves. 
Even if the direct beneficial conduct that has been engendered by 
external incentives cannot be deemed altruistic, the public expres­
sion of (limited) altruism as the proper standard for conduct and 
judgment is bound to be internalized by the agent as well as by her 
community and to prompt future self-initiated and proactive - that 
is, genuinely altruistic, virtuous - beneficial actions.76 
Phrased so broadly, however, this conclusion is problematic. 
The difficulties are rooted in the inherent tension - some would 
say, contradiction - between two fundamental characteristics of 
law: its normativity and its coerciveness.77 Thus, alongside the 
claim that legally-induced other-regarding conduct can help rein­
force the other-regarding side of ourselves, there is the undeniable 
possibility that the law's coercive interference in people's lives also 
might have a counterproductive impact. The law's threat to individ­
ual freedom and control might create resentment or psychological 
reactance, which, in tum, may cause people to form negative atti­
tudes with regard to the source of this threat (the coercive law), 
thus undermining the very possibility of such law serving a trans­
formative function.78 If institutionalizing altruism were to create 
resentment, it might, in the end, impede - rather than enhance -
the inculcation of altruistic motives. 
74. See Mansbridge, supra note 57, at 138; cf. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Relativism, Per­
sons, and Practices, in RELATIVISM: lNrERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION 418, 424 
(Michael Krausz ed., 1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & Pun. A.FF. 
3, 8-10 {1991). 
75. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 288-92 (1989). 
76. See SHELEFF, supra note 54, at 181; Viola C. Brady, Note, The Duty to Rescue in Tort 
Law: Implications of Research on Altruism, 55 IND. L.J. 551, 558-59 {1980). 
77. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, In Defense of Defiance, 23 PHIL. & Pun. A.FF. 24 
{1994). 
78. See Brady, supra note 76, at 560; see also Landes and Posner, supra note 12, at 94 
(suggesting that some methods for promoting beneficial interventions, "notably imposing 
legal liability for [non-interference]," may turn out to be counterproductive, because they 
"may reduce the public recognition accorded to the altruistic rescuer and [thus] the number 
of altruistically motivated rescues"). 
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Indeed, in order to perform effectively its value-shaping func­
tion, the law must "bargain against the people's [pre-existing] pref­
erences."79 Legal norms may be successfully designed to affect 
people's values and preferences, but only if the norms are not 
overly ambitious, if they acknowledge that both the law and the 
prevailing ethos are cultural systems and, as such, usually evolve 
only gradually.80 Neither the goals of the legal norm nor the means 
it employs should be perceived as unreasonable and, therefore, of­
fensive if the norm is to have actual transformative consequences. 
It would appear that encouraging good samaritanism by secur­
ing restitution of the costs of benevolent interventions is precisely 
the moderate legal device needed to inculcate altruism. It is much 
less coercive than the more resolute legal norms, which encourage 
beneficial interferences by establishing positive duties of assistance 
and by imposing criminal or civil sanctions in cases of nonperform­
ance. It is a reasonable device for promoting limited altruism, an 
attitude toward others that calls for other-regarding action and mo­
tives without mandating selflessness or challenging the existence -
even predominance - of the self-regarding standpoint of agents. 
Therefore, allowing restitutionary relief for good samaritans may 
mitigate, if not entirely eliminate, any resentment toward the law's 
altruistically oriented interference.81 It also avoids tainting the mo­
tives of potential benefactors with any possibility of personal (tangi­
ble) gain or reward.82 Hence, contrary to the Glenn dictum, 
restitutionary measures can promote - rather than do violence to 
- "the kindest and best effusions of the heart."83 
79. Owen M. FISs, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
HAR.v. L. REv. 1, 54-55 (1979). 
80. Cf. RONALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 225-75 (1986) (developing the analogy be­
tween the law and a chain novel). 
81. Hence, it is also plausible to assume that the availability of restitutionary relief would 
not significantly reduce the public recognition accorded to the altruistic rescuer and, there­
fore, would not cause any decrease in the incidence rate of intervention. See Levmore, supra 
note 12, at 885-86; Mclnnes, supra note 12, at 44 n.45. On the other hand, it may well be true 
that in cases of extreme distress - notably clear danger to a person's life - the more reso­
lute and coercive devices of tort and criminal law may lead to superior behavioral conse­
quences (as compared to those induced by the mere availability of restitutionary relief). 
Furthermore, in such limited cases, it is possible that imposing civil or criminal liability for 
noninterference would not be considered excessive legal interference with individual 
freedom. 
82. For an elaborate discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 158-59. 
83. Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442, 448 (Or. 1887). 
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Thus far, I have tried to show that restitutionary claims in cases 
of good samaritan interventions can be supported by altruism-based 
arguments. The remainder of this section continues this characteri­
zation of such arguments by comparing them to the first rationale 
suggested for our doctrine - personal liberty. At first glance, the 
difference between the altruism rationale and the personal liberty 
rationale is obvious. The latter rationale focuses on the beneficiary, 
insisting that in certain, well-defined circumstances, encouraging in­
tervention can correspond to, or even be required by, her claim to 
personal liberty. In contrast, the former rationale addresses the 
good samaritan, with the intention of inculcating potential benefac­
tors with the value of altruism, of reinforcing their - and that of 
society at large - other-regarding standpoint of the self. 
These different starting points and theoretical justifications 
notwithstanding, the two rationales can coincide in terms of the 
ramifications of their adoption as the normative guides for the legal 
doctrine. Such concurrence would result if the "other," whose in­
terests must be taken into consideration under the altruistic ration­
ale, were to be defined exclusively in terms of the beneficiary's 
autonomous will. In that case, concern for the other - more accu­
rately termed "respect" for the other - would require strict adher­
ence to the doctrinal recommendations of the personal liberty 
rationale. 
But this is only one possible, and by no means exclusive, inter­
pretation of the altruistic rationale, which can certainly incorporate 
other understandings of the vital interests of individuals. Such rival 
understandings need not necessarily negate the importance of the 
individual's interest in autonomy or personal sovereignty. This fric­
tion merely requires acknowledgment of the fact that personal sov­
ereignty is not the only interest that has bearing for an individual, 
and therefore, respecting another person's preferences (explicit or 
hypothetical) does not exhaust the concept of concern for others. 
Genuine concern for other people entails - according to this inter­
pretation - taking into account the whole spectrum of human in­
terests, particularly their well-being;84 and at times (where the 
individual's choice really is substantially non-optimizing), this must 
84. Another interest, which, in other contexts, may expand the conception of others' in­
terests leading to justified paternalism, is "integrity or self-respect." See Anthony T. 
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 774-86 {1983). 
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be done even if to the dissatisfaction of the beneficiary. 85 In other 
words, unlike the deferential stance entailed by respect for others, a 
sympathetic understanding of (and response to) another's predica­
ment as well as her well-being may require that the benefactor 
make a paternalistic decision and act in accordance with the benefi­
ciary's true interests and contrary to her explicit, implicit, and hypo­
thetical preferences.86 
Such paternalistic interference with people's preferences for 
"reasons referring exclusively to [their] welfare, good, happiness, 
needs, interests, or values," although "not recognized as such by 
those persons for whom the good is intended," infringes upon their 
freedom of choice.87 In certain cases where an individual's prefer­
ences are the result of a clear cognitive failure, ignorance, or ex­
treme pressure, a paternalistic overriding of her choices is said to be 
justified by reference to "what fully rational individuals would ac­
cept as [a form] of protection."88 This justification for preventing 
persons from exercising their free will, where their preferences are 
either explicit or can be easily determined, is a tenuous ("ideal­
ized") version of hypothetical consent. Therefore, even if only such 
a weak form of legal paternalism is involved, and (as in most cases 
of encouraging beneficial intervention in the face of the benefici­
ary's objections) no outright prohibition is at issue,89 such paternal­
istic interference cannot be supported by (and is instead 
antagonistic to) the personal liberty rationale as conceptualized in 
the previous section. Whereas altruism as respect for others offers 
an additional normative premise for the doctrine· endorsed by the 
personal liberty rationale, altruism as a paternalistic concern for 
others may lead to a completely different legal doctrine. 
85. See Richard J. Arneson, Paternalism, Utility, and Fairness, 43 REv. INTL. DE P.mr.. 409, 
435 (1989). 
86. See RoBIN WE.Sr, Taking Preferences Seriously, in NARRATIVE, AUTIIORITY, AND 
LAW 299, 319-30 (1993); see also Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in 
Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining 
Power, 41 Mo. L. REv. 563, 638-42, 647 (1982). There is some controversy respecting the 
comparative advantages and disadvantages of "judicial paternalism" and "legislative pater­
nalism." Compare WE.Sr, supra, at 330-39 with David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and 
Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519, 551-58 (1988). A discussion of this institutional question is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
87. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 19, 20, 23, 27-28 (Rolf Sartorius 
ed., 1983). 
88. Id. at 29; cf. Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REv. 479, 484-87 
(1989). 
89. For the distinctions between weak and strong versions of legal paternalism and be­
tween outright prohibition and making choices more difficult or less attractive, see Joel 
Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM, supra note 87, at 3, 8-11, 17. 
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Finally, there is one other interpretation of the altruistic ration­
ale with doctrinal consequences that diverge from those of the per­
sonal liberty rationale, although this divergence is not as significant 
as that manifested by the understanding of the altruistic rationale as 
paternalistic concern for others. This deviation could result from an 
approach that perceives the interest of promoting concern for 
others as a social value of intrinsic importance90 and that acknowl­
edges law's impact in inculcating this value.91 Hence, this approach 
can justify legal devices that encourage beneficial interventions -
and, therefore, arguably inculcate communal concern - even in 
cases where it is not clear that the intervention corresponds with 
the beneficiary's will, that is, where it is not possible to support such 
intervention by reference to her explicit, implicit, or hypothetical 
preferences. To be sure, nonpaternalistic altruism cannot yield a 
policy of encouraging interventions where the beneficiary's disap­
proval is - explicitly, implicitly, or hypothetically - clear. In bor­
derline cases, however, where it is hard to ascertain the preferences 
of the expected beneficiary, an approach that is not content with 
merely respecting people's preferences but also seeks to inculcate 
concern for others would reject the presumption of noninterference 
implied by the personal liberty rationale and would adopt, in its 
stead, the opposite presumption, according to which the law seeks 
to encourage beneficial interventions.92 
III. TOWA RD  A NEW DOCTRINE OF GOOD 
SAMARITAN INTERVENTION 
A. The Normative Framework 
By now, I hope that Glenn's spell has been effectively dissi­
pated. Neither personal liberty nor altruism, as I attempted to 
show in Part II, are necessarily antagonistic to good samaritan 
90. The interest of promoting concern for others obviously would be regarded as an in­
trinsic social value from a communitarian perspective, which emphasizes the human belong· 
ing to constitutive communities and the entailing value of social responsibility. See supra text 
accompanying note 53. The intrinsic value of such collective goods can be appreciated also 
from a liberal perspective, as long as we acknowledge that leading an autonomous life re­
quires a sufficient number of acceptable alternatives and that at least some of the social 
conditions that constitute such options are collective goods. See JosEPH RAz, THE MoRAL­
ITY OF FREEDOM 198-207 (1986). Inculcating social solidarity and concern can be perceived 
as one of these collective goods of intrinsic value. 
91. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76. 
92. As the text implies, there are two senses in which this approach is not paternalistic. 
Fust, it does not justify interference when it is clearly undesirable to the benefactor. Second, 
it is not motivated by a sympathetic overriding of the benefactor's "mistaken" preferences, 
but, rather, by a public interest of promoting concern for others. See Feinberg, supra note 89, 
at 13; Shapiro, supra note 86, at 547-48. 
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claims for restitution. On the contrary, in certain circumstances, 
both can serve as the normative underpinnings of these claims. 
Nonetheless, we have seen that neither necessarily acts to substanti­
ate the whole range of altruistically motivated interventions. These 
rationales yield a broad spectrum of doctrinal alternatives for shap­
ing the contours of a new doctrine of good samaritan intervention, 
and consequently, they require that a normative choice be made. 
At one end of this spectrum lies the personal liberty rationale, 
together with the altruistic rationale interpreted as respect for 
others. Both rationales - which, for the sake of simplicity, I join 
together below under the title of personal liberty - justify restitu­
tion by referring to the benefactor's (ex ante) preferences. Conse­
quently, under these rationales, restitution should be allowed if, and 
only if, in the given circumstances, (a) it was impractical to inquire 
into the actual preferences of the expected beneficiary, (b) there is 
no external indication that she disapproves. of the court-imposed 
contract of intervention in consideration of restitution of expenses, 
and (c) the intervention was clearly (ex ante) cost-beneficial to her. 
At the other end of this spectrum lies, as we have seen, the "al­
truism as a concern for other people's genuine interests" rationale. 
To the extent that our law would be willing to adopt this rationale 
as the normative guide for its restitutionary doctrine, it would re­
quire decisionmakers to consider which types of human interests 
and human predicaments justify legal overriding of people's prefer­
ences, because according to this stance, a potential beneficiary's 
veto need not always be respected. 
Between the two poles of the spectrum lies a third approach, 
which (unlike the first approach) does not perceive respect for 
others' preferences as the sole consideration at issue, but (unlike 
the second approach) does not endorse any sort of paternalism. 
Rather, it adds the consideration of inculcating concern for others 
and - in the name of this social value - allows restitution even if 
the interference involved was not as clearly advantageous to the 
beneficiary as required under the personal liberty rationale. 
The objective of Part III is not to arbitrate between these three 
possible rationales. Instead, it seeks to delineate - albeit only par­
tially and in rather broad lines - the contours of a restitutionary 
doctrine that seriously renounces Glenn. More particularly, in what 
follows, I examine three doctrinal issues: the significance of the in­
tervention's success; the benefactor's claim to remuneration for her 
time, effort, and expertise; and her right to compensation for losses 
she may have incurred due to her intervention. With regard to all 
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three questions, I demonstrate that discarding Glenn necessitates 
reforming the current approach to good samaritan intervention at 
common law (although the position adopted along the spectrum 
discussed above may create a corresponding range of diverging 
ramifications in terms of the required doctrinal changes). 
There is, however, one aspect of the existing doctrine that I 
would be content to endorse. Common law traditionally has differ­
entiated its response toward beneficial interventions according to 
the interest protected. In particular, claims of good samaritans 
whose intervention was aimed at rescuing life were treated some­
what more liberally than those of benefactors who preserved only a 
proprietary interest of another.93 Although, as indicated above, I 
believe that the approach at common law with respect to both types 
of intervention needs to be liberalized, I nonetheless appreciate the 
normative power of this distinction and, hence, seek to preserve it. 
My reason for this springs from the connection between the spec­
trum of possible rationales and the nature of the resource in­
volved.94 Thus, given the significance of bodily integrity for our 
physical well-being as well as the fact that our body is both the 
physical embodiment of our selves and the utmost reflection of who 
we are,95 it should not be surprising that even the traditional doc­
trine allows restitutionary claims for services rendered in rescuing 
another's life or health, notwithstanding certain types of objections 
(irrational or uninformed) on the part of the beneficiary.96 On the 
other hand, where the protected interest is not life or limb, but 
merely proprietary in nature, and where there are no specific cir­
cumstances indicating some unique characteristic(s) of the potential 
beneficiary's predicament, even this weak paternalism seems mis­
placed.97 With respect to proprietary interests, the significant nor­
mative choice that our law faces seems to be between the pure 
personal liberty rationale and the intermediate stance that gives 
weight also to the social interest in inculcating altruism. 
93. See Muir, supra note 14, at 310. 
94. For a related argument respecting another paradigmatic case of the law of restitution, 
see DAGAN, supra note 17, at 40-49, 63-108. 
95. See Russell W. Belk, The Ineluctable Mysteries of Possessions, in To HAvE PossES· 
SIONS: A HANDBOOK ON OWNERSHIP AND PROPERTY 17, 19 (Floyd w. Rudmin ed., 1991); 
Russell W. Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUMER REs. 139, 157 (1988); 
Ernst Prelinger, Extension and Structure of the Self, 41 J. PsYCHOL. 13, 18 (1959); Margaret 
Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1880-81 & n.117 (1987). 
96. See REsTATEMENT OF REsTrnmoN § 116 (c), (d) & cmt. b & illus. 2-4 (1937). For a 
particularly restrictive view, see MAsoN & CARTER, supra note 8, at 248-49. 
97. Cf. MAsoN & CARTER, supra note 8, at 242. 
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With this proposed distinction in mind, let me now tum to the 
three doctrinal issues mentioned above, beginning with the ques­
tion of the significance of the intervention's success. 
B. The Significance of the Intervention's Success 
The prerequisite of the Anglo-American law for allowing good 
samaritan restitutionary claims is - except, perhaps, with regard to 
an intervention directed at saving life98 - that the claimant's effort 
to preserve or protect the defendant's interest meet with actual suc­
cess. A fruitless intervention, even if reasonable, so the argument 
goes, cannot be said to produce "any net value for the defendant"99 
(that is, any enrichment), and in any case, "a reasonable [person] 
could say that [ s ]he would only have been willing to pay for a result, 
not an attempt."100 In contrast, under civil law systems, the good 
samaritan is not required to demonstrate "ultimate success," as long 
as she can show that she acted with "reasonable diligence."101 
In what follows, I argue that whichever rationale outlined in sec­
tion III.A above is applied, the civil law requirement of reasonable 
diligence is normatively preferable to the more demanding require­
ment of actual success applied at common law. In addition, I dis­
cuss the criteria according to which such reasonableness should -
as per these rationales - be examined. 
1. Against a Requirement of Ex Post Success 
The starting point for my discussion is the incentive effect of the 
current common law requirement of actual success. Making success 
the prerequisite for restitution of expenses incurred in altruistic in-
98. See Cotnam v. WISdom, 104 S.W. 164, 166 (Ark. 1907); Matheson v. Smiley [1932] 2 
D.L.R. 787, 791 (Can.); REsrATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 116 illus. 1 (1937). 
99. Wade, supra note 9, at 1186-87. 
100. BURRows, supra note 14, at 247 n.2; see also REsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN 
§ 117(1)(e) & cmt. d (1937). Professor Gareth Jones expresses a dissenting opinion. Based 
on an analogy to cases of preservation of life, he believes that fruitless but reasonable at­
tempts to preserve property should be recognized as sufficient grounds for restitutionary 
claims. See JoNES, supra note 16, at 149-50. For a similar point, see MAsoN & CARTER, 
supra note 8, at 238, 240. The discussion that follows can be read as a normative defense for 
this conclusion. 
101. See SIEG EISELEN & GERRITT PIENAAR, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT 280 (1993); 
LA VASSEUR, supra note 54, at 93-97; F.H. LAWSON ET AL., AMos AND WALTON'S INTRODUC­
TION TO FRENCH LAW 194 (2d ed. 1963); Dawson, (pt. 1), supra note 12, at 823; Paolo Gallo, 
Remedies for Unjust Enrichment in the History of Italian Law and in the Cadice Civile, in 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT: THE CoMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY oF THE LAW OF REsnnmoN 
275, 279 (Eltjo J.H. Schrage ed., 1995); R.D. Leslie, Negotiorum Gestio in Scots Law: The 
Claim of the Privileged Gestor, 1983 JUR. REv. 12, 15-16; Stoljar, supra note 54, at 99. For a 
similar conclusion reached by Talmudic civil law, see JONATHAN BLAss, JEWISH LAw FOR 
lsRAEL: UNJUST ENRICHMENT LAW 118 (1991) (Heb.). 
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terventions reduces the expected recovery of potential benefactors 
to below their actual expenses. This prerequisite thus amounts to a 
disincentive for such interventions. Because potential benefactors 
can rarely be certain in advance that their intervention will indeed 
succeed, they might be discouraged by such a requirement and, 
therefore, unwilling to undertake a costly intervention.102 
This behavioral impact undermines each one of the possible 
normative rationales underlying our doctrine. It is obviously anti­
thetical to the rationale of altruism as paternalistic concern for the 
genuine interests of others, as well as to the social value of inculcat­
ing concern for others: the merit (virtue) in intervention is rooted 
in a benefactor's willingness to incur inconvenience or danger in 
responding to another's need and, therefore, is not dependent upon 
success.103 
Furthermore, the disincentive created by the requirement of 
success also conflicts with the rationale of personal liberty because 
it is contrary to the potential beneficiary's hypothetical preferences. 
To be sure, the beneficiary would appreciate not having to pay for 
an unsuccessful intervention. Yet this advantage is bound to be 
outweighed (ex ante) by the disadvantage inherent in such an ex­
emption: discouraging potential benefactors and, thus, depriving 
the potential beneficiary of sources of potential assistance. As we 
have seen, under such a regime, any potential benefactor who is not 
willing to sacrifice her own resources for the benefit of others 
would be deterred from intervening unless confident of success. 
Because in most interventions success is not guaranteed, and be­
cause most potential benefactors - who, in the paradigmatic case 
under consideration, do not have any special social relations with 
the beneficiary - cannot be regarded as intending to assist gratui­
tously (they are not selfless), a requirement of ex post success frus­
trates potentially beneficial interventions. Thus, it works to the 
detriment of the potential beneficiary (provided, as will be empha­
sized shortly, that the interventions indeed are ex ante 
beneficial).104 
102. See Dawson, (pt 2), supra note 12, at 1115; Mcinnes, supra note 12, at 62. 
103. See LAVASSEUR, supra note 54, at 96-97; Dawson, (pt. 2), supra note 12, at 1115; 
Kleinig, supra note 58, at 386. 
104. Cf. McCamus, supra note 22, at 311-12. To be sure, I do not deny the possible exist­
ence of cases where the other-regarding motives of a particular potential benefactor would 
suffice in order to induce intervention, even if the law conditions recovery on success. See 
Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 95. But if, as I claim in the text, these cases are the 
exceptions to the rule, then the hypothetical preference of any potential beneficiary would be 
to opt for the legal norm that is most advantageous to her, i.e., the one that does not require 
success. 
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Yet some authors still insist that to eliminate the requirement of 
success would be undesirable.105 They point to the fact that success 
- complete or partial - is also required under maritime law.106 
The basis of their normative argument in favor of this requirement 
is twofold. First, they claim that if success were eliminated as a re­
quirement, there would not be enough incentive for benefactors 
who have begun to intervene, but have encountered difficulties, to 
press on and succeed, and not to stop at halfhearted attempts.101 
Second, they insist that - insofar as the disincentive created by the 
requirement of success is detrimental from the perspective of po­
tential beneficiaries - this flaw can be remedied, as it is in mari­
time law, by adjusting the amount of recovery received by 
successful benefactors so that ex ante potential benefactors are as 
motivated as they would be if they were to receive only restitution 
in all intervention attempts.1os 
I believe that both prongs of this counterargument are miscon­
ceived. First, while the concern with regard "to halfhearted efforts 
may be genuine, it seems to me that focusing on this concern is 
counterproductive from the perspective of the potential beneficiary. 
At least insofar as one agrees that the success requirement has a 
substantial disincentive effect, the advantage of the special treat­
ment that this requirement gives to halfhearted attempts seems in­
significant given that requiring success has the far more likely 
consequence of discouraging potential benefactors from making 
any effort whatsoever. In other words, if most potential benefac­
tors are deterred from intervening due to the fear of incurring fi­
nancial loss, what benefit would potential beneficiaries derive from 
the guarantee that they will not be charged for halfhearted 
attempts?109 
To be sure, this would not be the case if the second claim made 
by proponents of the success prerequisite were valid, because if a 
legal regime that requires success can still produce sufficient incen­
tives to intervene, the best of both worlds can, indeed, be realized. 
But I think that unfortunately, there is an important difference be­
tween the paradigmatic case under consideration and the maritime 
105. See BURRows, supra note 14, at 247; Levmore, supra note 12, at 894. 
106. See MAsoN & CARTER, supra note 8, at 244. For maritime law on this point, see, for 
example, A.D.M. Forte, Salvage Operations, Salvage Contracts and Negotiorum. Gestio, 1993 
JUR. RE.v. 247, 252-53. 
107. See BURRows, supra note 14, at 247; Levmore, supra note 12, at 894. 
108. See Levmore, supra note 12, at 894. 
109. Cf. Mcinnes, supra note 12, at 62 n.152. 
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cases in which this happy result is possible. In the maritime context, 
as I indicated above,11° rescuers are, in many cases, professional sal­
vors, skilled and equipped to undertake the complicated task of 
beneficial intervention at sea, doing so as their primary vocation. 
In contrast, the typical benefactor with whom this article is con­
cerned is a bystander who responds to another's distress, although 
this response distracts her from the ordinary pursuit of her prede­
termined objectives. This distinction is crucial for our purposes. 
For the maritime salvor, interventions are a matter of business; 
therefore, as long as her expected recovery exceeds the cost of her 
intervention (as it is under maritime law, which combines substan­
tial positive rewards in cases of successful intervention with a rule 
of no recovery - not even of expenses - where there is no suc­
cess), she will intervene whenever such intervention is expected to 
be beneficial and, at the same time, be motivated enough to com­
plete her task successfully.111 But whereas for the professional mar­
itime salvor, the possibility of extracting a positive reward will 
usually offset the risk of incurring uncompensated expenses and 
losses in cases of failed attempts, it is difficult to believe that this 
possibility would have the same effect on the garden-variety by­
stander of our paradigmatic case. The latter's intervention is not 
part of an enterprise, which is self-insured against failed transac­
tions. Therefore, if the law were not to provide her with external 
insurance - a guarantee that she would not be materially worse-off 
due to her other-regarding intervention - the typical bystander, 
who is likely to be risk averse respecting such a contingency, would 
abstain from intervening, even if faced with the possibility of posi­
tive recovery.112 
My conclusion, therefore, is that contrary to conventional wis­
dom, a reasonable person would not say that she "would only have 
been willing to pay for a result, not an attempt." Rather, the likely 
consequence of requiring success is overdeterrence of bystanders 
who are potential benefactors. Therefore, this requirement runs 
counter to the potential beneficiary's hypothetical preferences. 
110. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
111. See Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 101; Rose, supra note 12, at 176, 198. 
112. I therefore find myself in agreement with the traditional reluctance of the common 
law doctrine of good samaritan intervention to draw analogies from maritime law. See, e.g., 
Nicholson v. Chapman, 126 Eng. Rep. 536, 538-39 (1793). Whereas according to the tradi­
tional approach, the difference between these paradigms is that only in the case of maritime 
salvage is a legal incentive to intervene needed, I claim that in both cases, legal encourage­
ment is required, but that the type of incentive that has an impact on bystanders is different 
from the type of incentive that can affect professional maritime salvors. 
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This is the case when proprietary interests are at stake, because 
even risk neutral potential beneficiaries object to such over­
deterrence. This is even more so the case when an intervention is 
aimed at saving life or limb, with regard to which most potential 
beneficiaries are risk averse. Success, therefore, should not be a 
prerequisite for good samaritan claims. Instead, the concern of 
halfhearted attempts must be addressed as part of the inquiry as to 
the good samaritan's reasonable diligence, so that her claim will be 
rejected only if the intervention's failure is a result of her inappro­
priate withdrawal. 
I will not attempt to deny that where a good samaritan's attempt 
has failed, she cannot point to any actual enrichment of the benefi­
ciary.113 And although some have, in fact, attempted to reconcep­
tualize enrichment so as to include also the advantage of such 
attempts,114 to my mind, there is no need to do so. I concede that 
the concept of enrichment can be interpreted so as to support either 
of the conflicting doctrinal rules with regard to the requirement of 
success. This result does not disturb me, because in my opinion, 
"unjust enrichment" (in cases of good samaritan interventions as 
well as in other cases of restitutionary claims) is but a conclusion in 
need of supportive normative arguments.115 Hence, only by di­
rectly resorting to the pertinent normative considerations (in our 
case, reference to the rationales of personal liberty and of altruism) 
should and can doctrinal dilemmas be resolved. 
2. Reasonable Diligence in Good Samaritan Interventions 
The conclusion that not one of the rationales canvassed above 
can substantiate the requirement of success does not imply that the 
ex ante likelihood of success carries no weight. On the contrary, as 
I implied above, a legal regime guided by the personal liberty ra­
tionale must follow the civil law approach and be attentive to the 
question of whether the benefactor acted with "reasonable dili­
gence" or, more precisely, whether the act performed was to the 
advantage of the beneficiary from her perspective at the point in 
113. See Wonnell, supra note 23, at 169-70. 
114. See Peter Birks, Six Questions in Search of a Subject - Unjust Enrichment in a Crisis 
of Identity, 1985 JUR. REv. 227, 250; Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REv. 
1191, 1201-02 n.27 (1995). 
115. See Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in 
Private Law Theory, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming 1999). For a narrower 
claim that insists that cases of good samaritan intervention are different from other paradig­
matic cases of unjust enrichment and, therefore, are not necessarily concerned with the en­
richment of the beneficiary, see Muir, supra note 14, at 297-98; Stoljar, supra note 54, at 41. 
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time when the act was performed.116 In other words, potential ben­
eficiaries cannot be impervious to the range of different probabili­
ties of success, and they (or, rather, their hypothetical preferences) 
are bound to be more reluctant to allow interventions as the 
probability of success decreases.117 The (ex ante) appeal of inter­
vention is conditional upon the magnitude of the expected damage 
in the event that no intervention occurs and upon the expected cost 
of intervention.11s 
This observation can be formulated with greater precision. 
Consider the case of a potential beneficiary who is risk neutral with 
respect to the exigency triggering the intervention, so that her pref­
erences between contingencies are determined according to ex­
pected monetary values. This potential beneficiary would prefer 
intervention if, and only if, the expected value of the benefit it may 
generate (Eb) exceeds its cost (C).119 The expected benefit of inter­
vention (Eb) equals the magnitude of the expected damage (D) 
multiplied by the (ex ante) probability of success,120 that is, the ex­
tent to which the intervention seems, at the relevant point in time, 
to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of the damage (Ps).121 
Therefore, instead of focusing on the requirement of success, courts 
116. See Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Negotiorum Gestio in Roman and Modem Civil Law, 
13 CoRNELL L.Q. 190, 196 (1928); Rose, supra note 12, at 193. 
117. Can the co= on law requirement of success be interpreted as a proxy for desirable 
ex ante interventions that (as a proxy) avoids the possibility of judicial error, which might be 
involved in the assessment of ex ante desirability? See Saul Levmore, Obligation or Restitu· 
tion for Best Efforts, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1411, 1430, 1437, 1442 (1994). I believe that the 
answer to this question is no, for the same reason that the consideration of halfhearted at­
tempts is not determinative (see supra text accompanying notes 109-12): the disincentive 
effect of the requirement of success makes any advantage it may have in screening interven­
tions relatively negligible. 
118. See DANIEL FRIEDMANN, THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 90, 104 (2d ed. 1982) 
(Heb.); cf. BLASS, supra note 101, at 119. 
119. Notice that the discussion of the text deals only with securing that inefficient at­
tempts are not made. Potential beneficiaries may also be interested in making sure that 
benefactors will invest optimal amounts in their attempts: namely, that they will not invest 
less than the sum that equates the marginal benefit from rescue with the marginal cost. Such 
an optimal result is probably much more difficult for the law to secure unless it allows bene­
factors to receive positive rewards, which I believe it should not (see infra text accompanying 
notes 155-59). Hence, the text should not be read as suggesting that the doctrine which 
compensates for failed but ex ante reasonable attempts optimizes the benefactor's invest­
ment from a social welfare point of view. My claim is more modest: that if indeed we are 
unwilling to allow positive rewards, such a doctrine is preferable to the prevailing require­
ment of success. 
120. For the sake of simplicity, this equation assumes that success means full preservation 
of the resource (complete avoidance of D). A more formal presentation requires considera­
tion of partial success as well. 
121. Formally, P, is the difference between the probability of such damage occurring 
when no intervention takes place and the probability of its occurrence given such 
intervention. 
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that are guided by the personal liberty rationale should ask them­
selves whether indeed Eb - which equals D x Ps - exceeds C or, in 
other words, whether Ps exceeds CID. If, but only if, the answer to 
this question is affirmative, restitution should be granted.122 
However, the assumption of risk neutrality is not necessarily ac­
curate. At least with respect to contingencies that affect significant 
portions of their wealth, people tend to be risk averse - to care not 
only about the expected monetary values of these contingencies, 
but also about the uncertainty regarding the size of loss per se.123 
Risk averse people are, therefore, willing to pay (for example, 
purchase insurance or incur a certain, but rather minimal, loss) in 
order to avoid having to face uncertain outcomes.124 More pre­
cisely, people's value function seems to be concave for gains and 
convex for losses and steeper for losses than for gains, so that their 
response to losses is more extreme than to gains.125 
The implications of such an attitude to risk in the typical cases 
of good samaritan intervention is rather straightforward. Where 
the magnitude of the expected damage in the event that no inter­
vention occurs is significant and where the expected cost of such an 
intervention is relatively small, a risk averse potential beneficiary 
would prefer intervention to noninterference, even if Ps does not 
exceed CID. In other words, such a beneficiary is likely to perceive 
intervention as a form of insurance and be willing to reduce the risk 
that her resource will be damaged or destroyed by paying some pre­
mium - the expenditure of C (the cost of intervention) - even if 
the (expected) benefit from the intervention is less than its (certain) · 
cost. The more a beneficiary is risk averse, the more she is likely to 
prefer intervention, even where the expected monetary value is 
negative. 
Characterizing the attitude to risk of potential beneficiaries as a 
group is complicated. Even if we disregard idiosyncrasies which, in 
122. I do not consider the possibility of the intervention causing damage either to the 
beneficiary or to a third party. This contingency requires some fine-tuning of my argument, 
which is not necessary for the purposes of this article. 
123. See STEVEN SHAVELL, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 186 {1987). Risk 
aversion derives from the fact that people making decisions under uncertainty do not attempt 
to maximize expected monetary values, but rather, to maximize expected utility. See ROB­
ERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 44-45 {2d ed. 1997). Insofar as the 
truism of diminishing marginal utility of income is valid, it generates risk aversion and makes 
the degree thereof dependent on the concavity of the graph of utility of wealth. See 
SHA VELL, supra, at 186-88. 
124. See CooTER & ULEN, supra note 123, at 48-49. 
125. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Deci­
sions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CoNTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67, 
74-76 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987). 
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any event, the law cann'ot adequately address, the extent to which a 
potential beneficiary is risk averse is a function of the ratio between 
the value of the protected interest at stake and the total wealth of 
the beneficiary.126 This implies that most people are probably risk 
averse with respect to their lives and bodily integrity. Hence, this 
risk aversion allows the conclusion that with regard to this resource, 
the personal liberty rationale supports a considerable (although not 
total) relaxation of the requirement of ex ante reasonable diligence, 
as conceptualized above (obviously, the other rationales, if applied, 
would only serve to fortify this conclusion). A more subtle question 
arises with respect to proprietary interests. Due to the diversity of 
such protected interests and the diversity of potential beneficiaries, 
the doctrinal conclusion with regard to proprietary interests must 
rely on the pertinent presumption generated by the chosen ration­
ale: if our law were to adopt the "pure" personal liberty rationale, 
with its presumption of noninterference, it would probably opt for 
the more rigid requirement yielded by the assumption that the po­
tential beneficiary is risk neutral. In contrast, if the intermediate 
stance - which gives some weight also to the social value of incul­
cating altruism - were to be adopted, the opposite presumption 
would govern, and therefore, the more lax interpretation of the rea­
sonable diligence requirement would be applicable.121 
C. The Benefactor's Claim for Remuneration 
The second doctrinal issue I wish to consider relates to good 
samaritan claims for remuneration for time, effort, and expertise. 
Common law allows such recovery only with respect to preserva­
tion of life or limb and only if the services rendered were provided 
by trained professionals whose unsolicited services fall squarely 
within the realm of their vocations (the most typical case is the off­
duty physician who provides assistance in an emergency situa­
tion).128 Civil law - which originally disallowed any remuneration 
126. See SHA VELL, supra note 123, at 189; see also supra note 123. 
127. It should be recalled that as far as proprietary resources are concerned, I have dis­
counted the possibility of any paternalism being involved. 
128. See Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907); Matheson v. Smiley [1932] 2 
D.L.R. 787 (Can.); JoNES, supra note 16, at 163; KLlPPERT, supra note 22, at 110-11. But cf. 
REsrATEMENT OF REsrmmoN § 117 cmt. c (1937) (including the reasonable value of the 
services rendered within the applicable measure of recovery). The traditional common law 
dismissal of non-professionals' claims for remuneration is premised on the presumption of 
gratuity respecting such benefactors. See REsrATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 114 cmt. c 
(1937); REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsTITUTION § 3 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1 1983). 
This presumption, however, has been vigorously attacked, and many have urged for its rever­
sal. See, e.g., JoNES, supra note 16, at 147; Albert, supra note 20, at 97-98, 101-07. 
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for services and limited recovery to only the sum of the outlay -
currently seems to concur with the common law regarding the latter 
limitation, but not the former one, so that professional services ren­
dered in an ex ante beneficial intervention for the preservation of 
another's proprietary interest also trigger a valid claim for ·recov­
ery.129 Finally, although it seems common knowledge that the law 
prescribes the "reasonable" or fair market value of the services ren­
dered as the applicable measure of recovery in cases where a good 
samaritan's claim does hold,130 there is some disagreement with re­
spect to the valuation of such reasonable value.131 In the leading 
case of Cotnam v. Wisdom, 132 the court held that it should not con­
sider prevailing practices (in this particular case, the custom of phy­
sicians to graduate their charges according to the patient's ability to 
pay) that may indicate what the benefactor's colleagues would have 
charged for the service rendered.133 This view, however, is contro­
versial, and opposing it is the claim that any practice that affects the 
reasonable market value of the services rendered should be taken 
into account.134 
The claim put forth in this section is that no defense can be 
made on behalf of either one of common law's two traditional limi­
tations described above. This section maintains that both the altru­
istic rationale and the personal liberty rationale prohibit the courts 
from limiting renumeration awards to only those claims that meet a 
rigid prerequisite with regard to the type of resource preserved. 
Furthermore, I contend that although cases of nonprofessional in­
tervention may require some special caution, there is no justifica-
129. See LAVASSEUR, supra note 54, at 80-84; LAWSON ET AL., supra note 101, at 194; 
WILLIAM J. STEWART, THE LAW OF REsrrnmoN IN ScoTLAND: BEING MAINLY A STUDY OF 
THE PERSONAL OBLIGATION TO REDRESS UNJUST ENRICHMENT 168 (1992); Dawson, (pt. 2), 
supra note 12, at 1083, 1118-19; D.C. Fokkema & A.S. Hartkamp, Law of Obligations, in 
INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW FOR FOREIGN LAWYERS 93, 108 (J.M.J. Chorus et al. eds., 2d 
rev. ed. 1993); Leslie, supra note 101, at 21-22; Lorenzen, supra note 116, at 209; Martin, 
supra note 54, at 198. Dawson reports that European courts have awarded recovery only to 
"members of the learned professions," i.e., "physicians and attorneys." But as he justifiably 
insists, "the reasons applicable to [these rescuers] would justify the enlargement of the class 
of 'professionals' . . . . In life-rescue cases, as in property salvage, there seems to be no 
compelling reason why persons who use marketable skills developed for use in their own 
occupations should not recover the market value of the time employed. Recovery could then 
be allowed not only by physicians but by nurses or even by mountain guides." Dawson, (pt. 
2), supra note 12, at 1085, 1123. As I explain in the text below, my recommendation is for a 
further expansion of the range of potential benefactors. 
130. See REsTATEMENT OF REsrrnmoN §§ 116 cmt. a, 113 cmt. g, 117 cmt. c (1937). 
131. See PALMER, supra note 8, § 10.4. 
132. 104 s.w. 164 (Ark. 1907). 
133. Cotnam, 104 S.W. at 166-67. 
134. See Mcinnes, supra note 12, at 67 n.178. 
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tion, from either the perspective of personal liberty or altruism, for 
negating all good samaritan claims for remuneration for time and 
effort, even if outside the realm of the benefactor's professional ex­
pertise. Finally, this section concludes by addressing the question 
of the appropriate methods to measure recovery and suggest some 
criteria that can help resolve the current doctrinal disarray. 
1. The Overly Restrictive Doctrine 
In order to facilitate the discussion of these issues, we should 
recall the distinction between explicit, or accounting, cost and op­
portunity cost. Accounting cost is the expenditure or out-of-pocket 
costs incurred consequent to a certain course of action.135 Often 
the cost of our choices - respecting investment, consumption, or 
any other matter that requires allocation of scarce resources be­
tween competing ends - greatly exceeds the accounting cost. The 
true economic cost that an individual incurs in making a decision is 
the cost of the next best alternative that must be foregone in order 
to take one action rather than another.136 This cost (what has been 
relinquished by the agent in order to pursue her chosen course of 
action) is the true economic cost -. the opportunity cost - of that 
course of action.137 
It is clear that acknowledging this fact entails repudiating the 
traditional civil law dichotomous treatment of expenditures and 
services. Allowing a benefactor reimbursement only for explicit 
costs she has incurred cannot be justified because, in the event that 
the intervention requires a "loss of profitable time," excluding re­
muneration for the benefactor's services leaves intact some of the 
intervention's cost.138 Neither the rationale of personal liberty nor 
that of altruism justifies such a disincentive. 
Thus, provided that the intervention is ex ante beneficial, a po­
tential beneficiary (hypothetically) would prefer that possible bene­
factors be assured that their reasonable costs - either in the form 
of accounting costs or in terms of opportunity costs - will be cov­
ered, so that they are not discouraged from rendering assistance. 
(From the perspective of the beneficiary, it is immaterial whether 
135. See CooTER & ULEN, supra note 123, at 28. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Cf. Honore, supra note 69, at 237-38. 
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the benefactor subcontracts all of the tasks involved and submits 
them as expenses139 or whether she intervenes by herself.)14o 
Referring to the rationale of altruism does not alter this conclu­
sion. As long as the applicable measure of recovery does not in­
clude any component of gain, which could tempt people "to make a 
profit out of what should be a kindness,"141 there is no difficulty -
from the vantage point of the limited altruism toward which our 
proposed restitution doctrine may be directed - with compensat­
ing benefactors for the true (that is, full) costs of their interven­
tions. As I insisted above,142 serving the interests of others when no 
self-interest is furthered in so doing is virtuous enough. 
One conclusion that can be derived from these remarks is that 
there should be no difference in principle between claims for reim­
bursement of expenditures spent and claims for remuneration for 
services rendered. Furthermore, the above discussion should also 
provide sufficient support for the claim that the common law limita­
tion of allowing recovery only in cases where life and limb are at 
risk is misguided. 
To be sure, insofar as the underlying rationale applicable to the 
protection of life and limb incorporates a paternalistic component 
(which I assume to be absent in cases of proprietary interests), it 
may be that the public interest in promoting intervention would jus­
tify even stronger means of encouragement - such as positive re­
wards - in order to ensure that rescues do, indeed, take place.143 
(If this were to be the case, one could also expect some preferential 
treatment with regard to claims of professional salvors in order to 
encourage their presence and secure their willingness. )144 N onethe­
less, this does not imply that where proprietary interests are at 
stake, there is no justification for any encouragement. On the con­
trary, as I have just explained, both the altruistic rationale and the 
personal liberty rationale require that all types of costs that a bene­
factor invests in her intervention should be covered as long as they 
are ex ante justified (in the sense discussed in the previous section). 
Hence, regardless of whether proprietary interests are governed by 
139. See REsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN §§ 116 cmt. a, 113 cmt. h (1937) (entitling the 
benefactor to do so). 
140. See STEWART, supra note 129, at 168; Rose, supra note 12, at 202. 
141. Leslie, supra note 101, at 22. 
142. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62. 
143. But cf. JoNES, supra note 16, at 163 ("In my opinion it would not be desirable to 
reward the stranger who intervenes on land to save human life. This would be to impose a 
heavy financial burden on the assisted person."). 
144. This, indeed, is the case in maritime law. See BURROWS, supra note 14, at 237. 
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the pure personal liberty rationale or by an intermediate rationale 
that gives some weight to inculcating altruism, the conclusion re­
mains the same. Namely, with regard to recovery for good samari­
tans who act to preserve proprietary interests, there should be no 
distinction between claims for out-of-pocket costs and claims for 
the opportunity cost of time, effort, and expertise invested, whereby 
the former is allowed and the latter disallowed.145 
I believe that similar considerations act to cast doubt on the 
conventional rule - in both common law and civil law - that lim­
its the right to remuneration to professionals. I do not challenge 
the truism that in certain circumstances, intervention by non­
professionals should be discouraged. Indeed, where a more quali­
fied person is available, ready, and able to act, the law justifiably 
disallows any claim for restitution.146 This requirement - that the 
benefactor be the most "proper" or "suitable" person to act - is 
compatible with, even dictated by, all possible rationales: it is obvi­
ous that the services of the most competent person available are 
preferable above all, because her services are likely to yield the 
most effective result. But the conventional limitation under consid­
eration rajses a different, separate question. What if no profes­
sional is present and an available nonprofessional (a passerby 
lawyer who stumbles upon an emergency situation, for example) is 
competent enough to undertake the task at hand? Her intervention 
in such circumstances may, in fact, be desirable (as long as it is ex 
ante cost-beneficial). Leaving some of her true costs uncovered, 
however - disallowing any recovery for the value of her time, her 
opportunity cost - would result in an inappropriate disincentive, 
which cannot be justified by any one of the possible normative 
premises of the law of good samaritan intervention. In short, pref­
erence for professionals is appropriate and fully guaranteed by the 
requirement that the benefactor be the most competent person to 
act; yet no further discouragement of intervention by nonprofes­
sionals is warranted, and therefore, there is no justification for a 
blanket dismissal of the claims of such good samaritans for remu-
145. The text may be an overstatement if potential benefactors - due to, for example, 
some cognitive failure - underrate the value of time, effort, or expertise, as compared to 
out-of-pocket expenditures. But even if such a phenomenon is prevalent, it seems to me to 
have only marginal effects, which may justify some tightening of the requirements for claims 
for remuneration of opportunity costs, as opposed to claims for reimbursement of accounting 
costs, but cannot vindicate the bright-line distinction discussed in the text. 
146. See REsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN §§ 116 cmt. a, 114 cmt. b (1937); REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF REsTITUTioN § 3 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1 1983); BuRRows, supra note 14, 
at 244; JoNES, supra note 16, at 147-48; Muir, supra note 14, at 313-14. 
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neration for the time and effort they expended in performing their 
ex ante beneficial intervention.147 
Some authors nonetheless justify such a dismissal by emphasiz­
ing the prohibitive administrative costs of quantifying the remuner­
ation due to nonprofessionals who, unlike professional benefactors, 
do not sell equivalent services in the market.148 This point of criti­
cism may well undermine the above conclusion if the available mea­
sure of recovery is to be the reasonable market value of the services 
rendered. But as claimed in the remainder of this section, I think 
that this is not the appropriate measure of recovery for the time, 
effort, and expertise invested in good samaritan interventions. Fur­
thermore, the alternative measure of recovery that should, in my 
opinion, prevail - namely, the opportunity cost of the benefactor's 
decision to intervene - is not particularly difficult to administer 
when nonprofessionals are involved. 
2. The Measure of Recovery 
Awarding good samaritans the fair market value of their serv­
ices seems a reasonable mechanism - although, by no means, the 
only possible option149 - if we focus on evaluating the enrichment 
of beneficiaries.150 But as indicated above,151 I do not believe that 
the concept of enrichment is particularly enlightening for resolving 
doctrinal difficulties. Rather, the pertinent rationales - in our 
case, the values of personal liberty and of altruism - should serve 
as the springboard for resolving these issues. 
It is my hope that I have already satisfactorily established that 
- at least with respect to proprietary interests152 - both these ra­
tionales point to the same alternative measure of recovery: a mea­
sure that reflects the intervention's cost to the benefactor, rather 
than its benefit to the beneficiary.153 Only this measure, the bene-
147. For a similar conclusion with respect to maritime law, see Rose, supra note 12, at 
191. 
148. See Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 109-10; Mclnnes, supra note 12, at 67. 
149. For the multiplicity of measures of recovery that are used in the law of restitution 
under the heading of the beneficiary's gain, see DAGAN, supra note 17, at 12-22. 
150. See Wade, supra note 9, at 1186-87. 
151. See supra text accompanying note 115. 
152. I have already discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 143-44, cases of 
rescue of life in which larger measures of recovery may be required. 
153. Cf. MAsoN & CARTER, supra note 8, at 244. Interestingly enough, South African 
law seems to apply such a measure of recovery. See D.J. JoUBERT & D.H. VAN ZYL, Man­
date and Negotiorum Gestio, in 17 THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA <J[ 30, at 30-31 (W.A. Joubert 
& TJ. Scott eds., 1983); J.P. Van Nikerk, Salvage and Negotiorum Gestio: Explanatory Re­
flections on the Jurisprudential Foundation and Classification of the South African Law of 
Salvage, in UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT 148, 173 (T.W. Bennett et al. eds., 1992). 
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factor's opportunity cost (which is actually, in many cases, easily 
determinable),1s4 secures both elimination of any disincentive for 
ex ante beneficial interventions as well as guarantees that the bene­
factor will not extract from her intervention any positive reward. 
The latter concern needs to be reemphasized. Positive rewards 
are undesirable from the perspectives of both personal liberty and 
altruism.155 The possibility of extracting a positive reward out of an 
intervention may become a significant consideration for potential 
benefactors, which would be unfortunate.156 Contrary to the dic­
tates of the personal liberty rationale, this consideration may en­
courage interventions in cases where the cost of intervention 
exceeds the expected benefit. Although such interventions involve 
the risk of dismissal of the benefactor's claim, the possibility of a 
positive reward may, nonetheless, encourage some to take their 
chances. Furthermore, the likelihood of positive rewards is perni­
cious to the virtue of altruism. Even if, as I insist, altruism does not 
necessarily require material self-sacrifice, encouraging interventions 
that may be motivated by pure self-interest and, moreover, that 
may be (ex ante) counterproductive to the beneficiary's interests, in 
no way promotes or inculcates the virtue of altruism. 
But why shouldn't we allow benefactors to receive positive re­
wards as long as their recovery is limited to the expected benefit of 
the intervention to its beneficiary? The concern of the personal lib­
erty rationale regarding benefactor's overinvestment seems to be 
well protected if this condition is satisfied. Moreover, on face, the 
altruistic rationale is also not really undermined by such a rule, be­
cause the prospect of payment may cause individualists to rescue, 
but will neither decrease the number of rescues by altruists nor de­
crease the amount of altruism in the world. 
I think that this counterargument is not persuasive. Consider 
first the personal liberty rationale, and recall that the contract pre­
scribed by law according to this rationale is hypothetical only from 
the perspective of the beneficiary (the benefactor confers the bene­
fit voluntarily). Hence, a "price" closer to the benefactor's cost -
154. In my previous example of a passerby lawyer who stumbles upon an emergency 
situation, the opportunity cost is usually determined according to the lawyer's hourly charge. 
155. This, of course, is true so long as we are not concerned with paternalistic altruism, 
which is, in any case, inapplicable to proprietary interests. 
156. Another difficulty, which is sometimes mentioned with respect to positive rewards, is 
the concern that overly generous awards would create a moral ·hazard, i.e., that potential 
"benefactors" will create a demand (a risk or danger) for their own services. See Levmore, 
supra note 12, at 886-87. But the possibility of a deliberate creation of an emergency can be 
handled in other, more straightforward, ways, such as by forfeiture of the award and imposi­
tion of certain (civil or criminal) sanctions. See Rose, supra note 12, at 194. 
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a measure of recovery that leaves a greater share of the hypotheti­
cal contract surplus in the hands of the beneficiary - must be pref­
erable if we are really concerned with preserving personal liberty. 
Moreover, the alternative measure of recovery, which is based on 
the beneficiary's expected benefit, can easily be misapplied by the 
courts, and if such judicial errors take the form of overestimation, 
they will infringe upon beneficiaries' personal liberty.151 
More important still is the inadequacy of this proposed regime 
from the viewpoint of the altruistic rationale. The whole point of 
this rationale, as it is presented herein, is to affect the attitudes of ex 
ante individualists, rather then to change the attitude or the behav­
ior of ex ante altruists. A regime of positive rewards seems to lose 
the expressive or symbolic ramification of a genuinely altruistic 
doctrine, and is thus unable to transform ex ante individualists into 
other-regarding people. To be sure, I am not contending here that 
any kind of payment taints the moral implications of the paid-for 
action (in fact, I have argued earlier against this very proposi­
tion158). Nor do I think that there is a natural or conceptually nec­
essary limitation to the amount of utility that the actor can obtain 
and still preserve the moral significance of her act. All I assert is 
that unlike the right to reimbursement of costs (or their 
equivalent), a legal right to a positive reward, in this context at 
least, is likely to be perceived as a commercialization of the entire 
activity - the doing of it (of every aspect of it) for money - which 
is, in turn, likely to dilute the moral significance of beneficial 
interventions.159 
Hence my claim is that the opportunity cost of an intervention is 
the only remedy that responds to the normative premises underly­
ing the law of good samaritan intervention. It is, of course, the only 
available remedy where nonprofessional benefactors are con­
cerned, but it is no less appropriate in cases involving professional 
benefactors. To be sure, the fair market value of the services ren­
dered frequently could serve as a reasonable proxy for the profes-
157. See Long, supra note 12, at 431-32. 
158. See supra section II.C.2. 
159. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996). In other 
contexts, it may well be the case that some positive payoffs can coexist with an appreciation 
of the intrinsic virtue of the action. This is usually achieved by dissociating the action from 
the payoff, thus preserving an ambivalent understanding of commodified (paid for or other­
wise profitable) and noncommodified (altruistically given) action. See id. at 102-14. Because 
I can think of no way to achieve such dissociation if there is a legal entitlement to a reward in 
cases of good samaritan interventions, reimbursement of costs (or tµe equivalent thereof) 
seems to be the maximum measure that can be awarded without obliterating the potential 
shaping effect of our doctrine. 
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sional benefactor's opportunity cost. There could also be 
circumstances, however, where the professional benefactor's oppor­
tunity cost would be less than the customary fee (where the demand 
for her services is less than the regular demand for such services) or 
greater than the customary fee (due presumably to the high level of 
her expertise). As I indicated at the outset of this section, the law is 
baffling with regard to cases of divergence between the benefactor's 
fee schedule and the prevailing fee for such services. My analysis 
suggests that the former alternative - that has been hinted at in 
the case law, but frequently criticized in the literature - is the nor­
matively superior choice.160 
D. The Benefactor's Claim to Compensation for Losses 
Lastly, I turn to the question of whether a good samaritan 
should be entitled to compensation for damages to her property or 
her body that she suffered as a result of her (ex ante) beneficial 
intervention. As with the two doctrinal issues considered above, 
common law takes a reluctant (if not hostile) stance: except in 
cases where some negligence on the part of the beneficiary was the 
cause of the emergency that "invited" the intervention, common 
law consistently refuses to require her161 to compensate her bene­
factor for any damages caused to the latter (or to her property) due 
to the intervention. This rule applies regarding interventions aimed 
at protecting a beneficiary's proprietary interests as well as with re­
gard to interventions for the preservation of her life or health.162 
The traditional rule has come under criticism from scholars who 
have denounced the significance of the beneficiary's negligence163 
and have decried the extreme libertarian ("mind your own busi­
ness") premise underlying this legal doctrine, which does not re­
quire, under any circumstances, that a beneficiary compensate her 
benefactor for her losses.164 At times, reference has been made to 
civil law (especially in Germany and France), which takes a much 
160. See .ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN & RICHARD A. PosNER, THE EcoNOMICS OF CON· 
TRACT LAw 61 {1979). The conclusion respecting opportunity costs that are significantly 
higher than the customary fee of "regular" professionals should be somewhat modified: in 
such cases, the benefactor's recovery should also be conditioned on the unavailability of such 
"regular" professionals. 
161. Indeed, this section does not address possible proceedings the benefactor may 
launch against the person responsible {if any) for creating the emergency. Moreover, I as· 
sume that both the benefactor and the beneficiary are uninsured. 
162. See JoNES, supra note 16, at 154-55, 164-67; Levmore, supra note 12, at 898; Muir, 
supra note 14, at 323 . .  
163. See Levmore, supra note 12, at 898-99. 
164. See Honore, supra note 69, at 236. 
March 1999] Good Samaritan 1195 
more liberal approach and manipulates the possible causes of ac­
tion in order to indemnify, at least in cases of ex ante beneficial 
intervention aimed at life preservation, the rescuer (or her depen­
dents) for such losses.165 But this approach has also been criticized. 
Where the damage caused by the intervention is severe - the ex­
treme case obviously being the benefactor's death - the compen­
sation involved may be huge, and notwithstanding the moral appeal 
of the claim of the benefactor or her dependents, it seems harsh to 
lay the entire loss on the shoulders of the imperiled beneficiary who 
is at no fault.166 
This dilemma is genuine, and without easy solution. But I 
would, nonetheless, recommend the Israeli statutory mechanism.167 
As I hope to demonstrate below, this scheme can be interpreted as 
responding to the normative foundations of the law of good samari­
tan intervention, as analyzed herein. It is, furthermore, responsive 
to the criticism leveled at the traditional common law doctrine as 
well as to the reluctance toward its civil law counterpart. 
Israeli law treats the benefactor's proprietary losses differently 
from the way it deals with her bodily injuries. If "damage is caused 
to the property of the benefactor in consequence of [her interven­
tion], the Court may order the beneficiary to pay compensation to 
the benefactor if it considers it just to do so in the circumstances of 
the case."168 This discretionary authority is limited strictly to dam­
ages to the benefactor's proprietary interests. A different statutory 
framework is applied with respect to bodily injuries sustained by 
good samaritans pursuant to intervention. "A person who volunta­
rily without remuneration does any act to save the life or property 
of another or others" is entitled, in certain conditions, to compensa-
165. See LA VASSEUR, supra note 54, at 128-29; Dawson, (pt. 2), supra note 12, at 1108-12; 
Fokkema & Hartkamp, supra note 129, at 108; Stoljar, supra note 54, at 42, 144-46; Andre 
Tune, The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan, in THE Gooo SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, 
supra note 69, at 43, 51-54. 
166. See JoNES, supra note 16, at 166; Dawson, (pt. 2), supra note 12, at 1114-15; Stoljar, 
supra note 54, at 149-51. 
167. See infra text accompanying notes 168-69. 
168. Unjust Enrichment Law, § 5(a), 1979, 33 L.S.I. 44-45, (1978-79) (Isr.); see also Legis­
lation, Unjust Enrichment Law 1979 (Israel); 1 REsrmmoN L. REv. 213, 214 (1993). Daw­
son mentions a somewhat similar arrangement, which has been adopted by the Swiss 
judiciary, according to which discretion can be applied in order to scale down the liability of a 
rescued person for her rescuer's bodily injury in the event that such liability exceeds her 
ability to pay. See Dawson, (pt. 2), supra note 12, at 1116-17. As explained in the text, the 
Israeli rule differs both in its range of application (to proprietary interests alone) and in the 
factors of which it allows consideration (as will be indicated below, see infra notes 174-78 and 
accompanying text). 
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tion from public funds, which are administered as part of the social 
security apparatus.169 
The normative justification for allowing compensation, in cer:. 
tain circumstances, for damages sustained to a benefactor's prop­
erty in the course of and due to her intervention should be obvious 
by now. Disallowing compensation is tantamount to creating a dis­
incentive for a possible beneficial intervention,170 contrary to the 
hypothetical preferences of the beneficiary.171 Hence, superficially 
at least, there should be no distinction whatsoever between claims 
for restitution of expenses incurred and claims for compensation for 
damages caused.112 
I do not wish to dispute this need of the law to offset the disin­
centive effects of the risk of benefactors' damages.173 My point is a 
more modest one. I merely wish to emphasize the need to draw 
certain distinctions between restitution of expenses and compensa­
tion for damages and thereby caution against making a hasty anal­
ogy between these two issues. 
169. The National Security Law (Consolidated Version), § 287(5), 1995, 1522 L.S.I. 210, 
(Isr.) [Heb.]; see also Life-Saving Operations {Soldier Casualties) (Benefits) Law, § 2, 1965, 
19 L.S.I. 314, {1964-65) (Isr.) ("A soldier who sacrificed his life, or became an invalid, in 
rescuing a person from mortal danger shall, in all respects, be regarded as a fallen soldier or a 
Defence Army of Israel invalid, as the case may be."). A similar solution was reported to be 
applied in Austria and has been strongly recommended by leading authorities. See JoNES, 
supra note 16, at 167; Dawson, (pt. 2), supra note 12, at 1121 & n.112; Honore, supra note 69, 
at 236-37. For similar, although less comprehensive, schemes in other countries, see John P. 
Dawson, Rewards for the Rescue of Human Life?, in THE Gooo SAMARITAN AND nm LAW, 
supra note 69, at 63, 75-67, 88; Stoljar, supra note 54, at 151-52; Wade, supra note 9, at 1188 
n.26. 
170. See Albert, supra note 20, at 108; cf. Mclnnes, supra note 12, at 68. 
171. See Honore, supra note 69, at 236. 
172. Moreover, at times, the distinction between expenditures and losses may seem "arbi­
trary and uncertain." Mclnnes, supra note 12, at 69; see Albert, supra note 20, at 104 n.105; 
cf JoNES, supra note 16, at 164-65 (stating that courts should alert themselves to the possibil­
ity of a claim for expenses that conceals a claim for loss suffered). 
173. Such an attitude is implied by Landes and Posner. They maintain that there is no 
need to permit benefactors to obtain compensation for damages they incur: 
(i]f the probability of serious injury to the (benefactor] is slight ex ante, then the ex­
pected cost of (her intervention] will not be substantially higher than if there were no 
danger, while if the probability of a serious injury to the (benefactor] is high ex ante, the 
net expected benefits from the rescue attempt are apt to be small or even negative. In 
neither case is there a substantial basis for seeking to alter the level of (altruistically 
induced) rescues by always giving the (benefactor] a right to compensation for [her] 
injury. 
Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 111-12. Although I agree with the latter conclusion, I do 
not think it implies - as Landes and Posner suggest - a vindication of the common law 
blanket refusal to allow compensation. These authors ignore the intermediate (and, there­
fore, probably most frequent) cases in which the expected injury is not slight, so that compen­
sation is not superfluous, but is still not too high, and the intervention is, therefore, not (ex 
ante) undesirable. The doctrine suggested below seeks to accommodate these cases, as well 
as both the extreme categories referred to by Landes and Posner. 
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To begin with, if the intervention has been performed by a pro­
fessional who sues and recovers remuneration for her services, one 
should be aware of cases where the benefactor's fee schedule al­
ready incorporates a risk premium, so that no further compensation 
is necessary to offset the disincentive effect of the risk of dam­
ages.174 But even if no such double compensation is involved, there 
is still a need to distinguish between restitution and compensation, 
at least with respect to emergency cases involving people's proprie­
tary interests. 
When I discussed the question of restitution of good samaritan 
expenses, I considered the beneficiary's possible risk aversion to the 
damage that the intervention was aimed to prevent. This possibility 
led me to the conclusion that if the law were to adopt an intermedi­
ate stance that confers some weight on the social value of inculcat­
ing altruism, it also would need to adopt a lax interpretation of the 
reasonable diligence requirement.175 The same reasoning, however, 
cannot be applied in this context because, unlike the accounting 
and the opportunity costs of intervention, which are relatively fixed 
ex ante, the cost of the benefactor's damages cannot be predeter­
mined. Therefore, from the potential beneficiary's vantage point, 
the contingency of excessive damage to the benefactor is just as 
risky as the contingency of the occurrence of the damage that the 
intervention is meant to prevent (which relates, I assume now, to 
her proprietary interests).176 Consequently, even risk averse bene­
ficiaries would opt for a rigid interpretation of the reasonable dili­
gence requirement. If indeed - as I assume throughout - there is 
no paternalistic overriding of beneficiaries' hypothetical prefer­
ences when proprietary interests are at stake, the law should also 
adhere to this rigid interpretation. 
In short, where proprietary losses to the benefactor are a rea­
sonable result of her intervention, compensation for such injuries 
should be allowed only if they are ex ante cost-beneficial, that is, 
only if the expected benefit of an intervention (or, the magnitude of 
the expected damage it is aimed to prevent multiplied by its ex ante 
probability of success) exceeds its expected cost (which is the sum 
of its accounting and opportunity costs and of the expected cost of 
174. See Albert, supra note 20, at 118. 
175. See supra text accompanying note 127. 
176. Tue text assumes that the extent of uncertainty of the two risks involved - losing 
the interest that is at peril and being exposed to tortious liability - is similar as well. If this 
assumption is relaxed and the beneficiary is risk averse, the comparison of the expected risks, 
suggested in the text below, is not sufficient, and due consideration must also be given to the 
relationship between their standard deviations. 
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the damage that may occur to the benefactor's property as a conse­
quence of her intervention). 
This analysis, however, does not apply with respect to cases 
where the intervention is aimed at protecting life or limb and not 
proprietary interests. One can hardly deny that the risk aversion of 
potential beneficiaries respecting bodily injuries is typically greater 
than their risk aversion in the context of monetary losses, even if 
significant, as in the case of beneficiaries who may be found liable 
for their benefactors' damages.177 Hence, whereas the risk of such 
liability is deemed to make even a potential beneficiary who is risk 
averse somewhat cautious respecting an ex ante beneficial interfer­
ence with her proprietary interests, she can be presumed to take a 
much less reluctant stand when her life or limb is at stake. In other 
words, her risk aversion regarding bodily injuries outweighs her risk 
aversion respecting monetary liabilities, so that the lax, rather than 
the rigid, interpretation of the reasonable diligence requirement re­
flects her hypothetical preferences. Furthermore, insofar as the law 
would apply some version of the paternalistic interpretation of the 
altruistic rationale with regard to the individual's interest in her 
bodily integrity, , we could find justification for encouraging inter­
ventions aimed at protecting these interests, even if an intervention 
deviates from the beneficiary's hypothetical preferences.11s 
The foregoing discussion justifies the need to reform common 
law with regard to compensation of benefactors for proprietary 
damages they incur and explains the need to grant the judiciary a 
margin of discretion to accommodate the considerations that should 
delineate the compensatory liability of the beneficiary. Yet should 
the conclusions of this discussion be applicable only to the benefac­
tor's proprietary damages? What about her bodily injuries? Do 
bodily injuries not entail precisely the same considerations and, 
therefore, require precisely the same doctrinal conclusion? How 
can we justify a statutory scheme that exempts beneficiaries - con­
trary to the most basic maxim of mutual responsibility - from lia­
bility for bodily damage to their own benefactors and shifts the cost 
to the public pocket? 
It seems to me that the need to resort to a public law solution 
when a benefactor has suffered bodily injury derives from the fact 
that this is the most extreme - and, hence, most troubling - in­
stance in which both rules of no recovery (the traditional common 
177. See supra text accompanying note 126. 
178. As the text implies, however, one can assume that this paternalistic overriding would 
still be limited. 
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law doctrine) and of (relatively) easy recovery (its civil law counter­
part) are unsatisfactory. Leaving such a benefactor to her own de­
vices is not an acceptable solution: it undermines altruism, and 
usually, it also contradicts the hypothetical preferences of potential 
beneficiaries. As critics of the civil law approach frequently com­
ment, 179 however, compensation for bodily injury is typically high, 
and imposing such a prohibitive liability on an innocent beneficiary 
- even where the intervention corresponds with her hypothetical 
preferences1so - seems just as unacceptable an outcome. The so­
cialization of the risks of good samaritan interventions averts both 
of these undesirable results. Moreover, the "public subsidy" of al­
truistic interventions that lead to bodily injury of benefactors -
spreading the cost of mutual aid over the whole community in these 
extreme circumstances - can be interpreted as (at least a symbolic) 
reaffirmation of the public interest in inculcating the virtue of 
altruism.1s1 
IV. EPILOGUE 
The spirit of Glenn v. Savage has dominated the common law 
for far too long. It has entailed a hostile attitude toward claims 
made by good samaritans. It has led to a distortion of the doctrine 
in vital aspects - for example, establishing the undesirable require­
ment of success; applying an overly narrow scope of admission of 
claims for remuneration for time, effort, and expertise; and insisting 
on a blanket refusal of any compensation to benefactors for dam­
ages they incur consequent to their intervention. 
A careful analysis of the normative justifications of Glenn v. 
Savage exposes their weaknesses, demonstrating that neither per­
sonal liberty nor altruism justify the common law's traditional re­
luctance with regard to the monetary claims of good samaritans. 
Indeed, we have seen that both values mandate - albeit for differ­
ent reasons and in differing degrees - radical reform of the pre­
vailing rules. Such reform can and should be informed by 
comparative analysis. Hence, I pointed to the civil law requirement 
of reasonable diligence as a better rule than the common law re­
quirement of success and to the Israeli complex statutory scheme 
regarding benefactor damages as a relatively satisfactory solution to 
179. See supra text accompanying note 166 . 
180. Obviously, the objection to exacting restitution from the beneficiary is even stronger 
when the intervention was not justified in terms of her hypothetical preferences but, rather, 
only due to the law's paternalistic stance. 
181. See SHELEFF, supra note 54, at 135; cf. Dawson, (pt. 2), supra note 12, at 1121. 
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the difficult consequences of both the common law and civil law 
doctrines. 
In the final analysis, however, arbitrating between doctrinal al­
ternatives requires an explicit normative investigation. Only such 
an investigation could justify my recommendations for these doctri­
nal "borrowings." Only an explicit normative discussion could help 
specify the more precise meaning of reasonable diligence and ex­
plain why claims for remuneration for time, effort, and expertise 
should not be limited strictly to professional benefactors who act to 
save life and limb, and why the proper measure of recovery in such 
claims should be the benefactor's opportunity cost. Finally, as we 
have seen, with regard to some doctrinal issues, the recommenda­
tions of the personal liberty rationale and those of the altruistic ra­
tionale (more precisely, of some of its interpretations) diverge. 
With regard to these issues, there is no choice but to confront our 
commitment to personal liberty, the significance we attribute to in­
culcating altruism in our society, and our instinctive sense of sympa­
thetic concern for the genuine interests of others. 
